HONG KONG.

RETURN to Two Addresses of the Honourable The House of Commons, dated respectively 13 and 27 February 1857;—*for*,

(ADDRESS, 13 February 1857.)

"COPIES of 'REPORT on *Hong Kong*;' 'REPORT on *Chusan*;' and 'MINUTE on the British Position and Prospects in *China*,' by Mr. *R. Montgomery Martin*, when Treasurer to The Queen at *Hong Kong*, and a Member of Her Majesty's Legislative Council in *China*."

(*Mr. Cayley.*)

(ADDRESS, 27 February 1857.)

"COPIES of Governor *Davis*' Separate Despatch, dated the 20th day of August 1844, enclosing Mr. *Montgomery Martin*'s Observations on the Colony of *Hong Kong*; of Lord *Stanley*'s Despatch, No. 66, of the 17th day of December 1844, to Governor *Davis*; and of Governor *Davis*' Despatch, No. 44, of the 25th day of April 1845, upon the same subject."

(*Mr. John Ball.*)

Colonial Office,
21 March 1857.

H. LABOUCHERE.

Ordered, by The House of Commons, *to be Printed*,
21 *March* 1857.

SCHEDULE.

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Ms. Rowena T Robinson

on 29 March, 2019

PAPERS RELATING TO THE COLONY OF HONG KONG, &c.

— No. 1. —

(Separate.)

No. 1.
Governor Davis to the Right Hon. Lord Stanley.
20 Aug. 1844.

COPY of DESPATCH from Governor *Davis* to the Right Hon. Lord *Stanley*.

Victoria, Hong Kong, 20 August 1844.
(Received, 5 December 1844.)

My Lord, (Answered, No. 66, 17 December 1844, p. 15.)

HAVING been requested by Mr. R. M. Martin to forward to your Lordship the accompanying observations from himself on the colony of Hong Kong, I have complied with his request; but at the same time caused to be addressed to him the enclosed letter, in which I have conveyed my general opinion as to his paper.

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It is fair, however, to Mr. Martin to observe, that his remarks were written after only a few weeks' residence, under circumstances of very indifferent health. I could easily point out errors in regard to facts and conclusions (did I deem it necessary to dwell upon the subject), some of which will be sufficiently apparent from the public despatches.

I regret the strength of expression which Mr. Martin has made use of in this paper, since much of it must be viewed as applying to the proceedings and representations of my distinguished predecessor, Sir Henry Pottinger. I do not deem it necessary, however, to detain your Lordship further on the subject, except to observe, that I cannot give the sanction of my opinion on its general tenor.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. F. Davis.*

Enclosure 1, in No. 1.

Encl. 1, in No. 1.

REPORT on the Island of HONG KONG.

LOCALITY.

Report on the Island of Hong Kong.

HONG KONG, which in the Chinese language signifies, "Red Harbour," is in north lat. 22° 16′ 27″, east long. 114° 14′ 48″, distant about 40 miles east from Macao. It forms one of the numerous but scattered group of lofty islands termed the "Ladrones," which vary in size and height, but agree in their arid and rugged features. The length of the island from east to west is about eight miles, with a breadth of from two to four miles. It is separated from the main land of China by a strait or inlet of the sea, varying in breadth from half a mile to three miles; one entrance, the Lymoon Pass, being only about one quarter of a mile wide.

PHYSICAL ASPECT.

The island consists of a broken ridge or "hogsback" of mountainous hills running from W. N. W. to E. S. E., at an average height of about 1,000 feet; but from this ridge and its spurs various conical mountains are elevated to the height of 1,500 to 2,000 feet above the sea, and very precipitous; the whole island, indeed, rises abruptly from the ocean, particularly on the north face. There are a few narrow valleys and deep ravines through which the sea occasionally bursts, or which serve as conduits for the mountain torrents; but on the north side of the island, especially where the town of Victoria is built, the rocky ridge approaches close to the sea, and it was only by hewing through this ridge that a street or road could be made to connect the straggling town of Victoria, which stretches along the water's edge for nearly four miles, although only comprising about 60 European houses, and several Chinese huts and bazaars. Here and there, on the tops of some isolated hills, or along the precipitous slopes of the mountains, some houses have been constructed; but the rugged, broken, and abrupt precipices, and deep rocky ravines, will ever effectually prevent the formation at Victoria of any concentrated town, adapted for mutual protection, cleanliness, and comfort. Hong Kong cannot be said to possess any vegetation; a few goats, with difficulty, find pasturage; after the heavy rains of May, June, and July, the hills

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hills assume somewhat of a greenish hue, like a decayed Stilton cheese; but the whity-brown or red streaked ridges, with the scattered masses of black rocks, give a most uninviting and desolate aspect to the island, which is unrelieved by the adjacent main land, whose physical features are precisely similar to those of Hong Kong, its mountain tops and sides presenting the appearance of a negro streaked with leprosy.

Geology.

There is no igneous formation in Hong Kong; the island partakes of the same geological character as the whole south coast of China, excepting that it seems of older formation. The structure may be briefly described as consisting of decomposed coarse granite, intermixed with strata of a red disintegrating sandstone, crumbling into a stiff, ferruginous-looking clay. Here and there huge boulder-stones, which gunpowder will not blast, may be found embedded in a stiff pudding earth, or they are strewed over the tops and sides of the mountains. Gneis and feltspar are found in fragments; that the granite is rotten and passing, like dead animal and vegetable substances, into a putrescent state, is evidenced from the crumbling of the apparently solid rock beneath the touch, and from the noisome vapour which it yields when the sun strikes fervidly on it after rain. On examining the sites of houses in Victoria, whose foundations were being excavated in the sides of the hills, the strata appeared like a richly prepared compost, emitting a fetid odour of the most sickening nature, and which at night must prove a deadly poison. This strata quickly absorbs any quantity of rain, which it returns to the surface in the nature of a pestiferous mineral gas. The position of the town of Victoria, which may be likened to the bottom of a crater with a lake, prevents the dissipation of this gas, while the geological formation favours the retention of a mortific poison on the surface, to be occasionally called into deadly activity. There is no extent of marsh on the island capable of generating miasm; but the heavy rains are annually washing large portions of the mountains through deep ravines into the Bay, and thus continually exposing a fresh rotten surface to the sun's rays, and preserving a focus of disease which will finally become endemic. Vast quantities of the silt from the hills are being deposited along the shores of the harbour, which owing to this circumstance, and the rapid receding of the tides from this coast, is becoming shoaler every day. The greater extent of the bay has only four to five fathoms, and in the depth of the stream there is only six to seven fathoms. In no great interval of time the harbour of Hong Kong will be too shoal in many places for large vessels.

Climate.

It is difficult to convey by thermometrical registers an accurate idea of the climate of any place. The range of the thermometer will not indicate the pressure of the atmosphere; the barometer in or near the tropics is of little utility as an index; the hygrometer, imperfectly shows the quantity of rain which is in solution; while the height of the land, its configuration, the nature of the soil, the extent and quality of the vegetation, the exposure to the sea, all influence what is comprised under the word climate. In some respects the whole coast of China partakes of the climatic characteristics of the opposite coasts of the American continent, particularly as regards the extremes of temperature and its depressing influence on mental or bodily exertion.

For six months in the year, April to September, the heat varies from 70° to 90° F. (*see* Monthly Thermometrical Register* in Appendix), but occasionally during the other six months the heat is also very great, the thermometer having been known to stand at 80° F. on Christmas Day. The island being on the verge of the tropics, is subject to almost the extremes of the torrid and temperate zones, even on the same day the range of mercury in the thermometer is very great, and the vicissitudes are exceedingly trying to the European constitution. But neither the range from heat to cold, nor the quantity of moisture in the atmosphere, will adequately convey an idea of the effects that this climate is capable of producing on the human frame.

* Not received.

During April, and part of May, when the sun is approaching rapidly from the Equator, there is a dry, burning heat, with a cloudless sky; but towards the end of May, and throughout June, as also during part of July, the rain descends in torrents, with a force and continuance such as I have never seen in India, Africa, Australasia, or any other part of the world. The clouds pour down one vast sheet of water, washing away hills and rocks, furrowing the island with deep ravines, and saturating the soft, porous, putrescent strata to the extent of many feet, with daily renewed moisture. In the intervals of rain, the vertical sun acts with an intense evaporating power, and a noxious steam or vapour rises from the fetid soil, yielding a gas of a most sickly and deleterious nature, exactly such as I experienced on the coast of Africa in 1824, when I was seized with an "earth fever," while in Her Majesty's service, from the effects of which I with great difficulty recovered, but of which most of my brother officers perished.

This morbific gas does not arise from vegetable or animal decomposition; there is none on the island of any extent; but decomposed mineral substances yield an aeriform poison, under some circumstances, of a more deadly nature than either of the other kingdoms of nature. This gas does not rise more than a few feet from the earth; it slowly mingles with the surrounding atmosphere, and when not causing immediate illness, produces a depressing effect on mind and body which undermines and destroys the strongest constitutions.

Military and naval men who have served in Africa and in India, feel the effects of the sun in Hong Kong in a manner never before experienced; even at Macao, only 40 miles west

west of Hong Kong, Europeans may walk about the whole day in the month of July, when to do so at Hong Kong would be attended with almost certain death. Neither sepoys nor Chinese can endure the climate even so well as Europeans, whose stamina they do not possess. The Chinese deem it a dangerous experiment to prolong their abode in the island beyond a certain time; they have ever viewed the climate as injurious to health and fatal to life. The Europeans who survive two or three years' residence in this climate, get a lassitude of frame and an irritability of fibre which destroys the spring of existence. A malign influence operates on the system in a most distressing manner, which is not removed by a return to Europe; on the contrary, the sufferers frequently die in England soon after their arrival.

Diseases and Mortality.

The prevailing disease of Hong Kong is a fever combining the character of the African and West India fevers. It was at first supposed to be epidemic, but it has now become endemic, and may be assumed to be the fixed malady of the island. Diarrhœa and dysentery form the next most fatal class of diseases. Last year the strength per annum of the European and Native troops was 1,526, and the number who passed through hospital in the year, amounted to 7,893; thus, on an average, every man went through the hospital more than five times in the year! Of the diseases with which they were afflicted, 4,069 were fevers; 762, diarrhœa; 497, dysentery; and 180 were pulmonic complaints. The total number of deaths out of 1,526 men, was 440, or 1 in 3 ½. The fatal fever cases were 155; ditto, diarrhœa, 80; the fatal dysentery cases were 137. The destruction of life since our occupation of Hong Kong has been enormous. Last year the deaths among the troops in the island amounted to 1 in 3 ½; at Chusan, to 1 in 29 ½; and at Koolungsoo, to 1 in 12 ½. Her Majesty's 98th Regiment lost at Hong Kong in 21 months, 257 men by death. But in this and other regiments, it is not merely the deaths which indicate disease and a pernicious climate, it is the number of men invalided, and constantly unfit for duty. One-half the men of a company are frequently unable to attend the parade; out of 100 men, there are sometimes not more than five or six men fit for duty.

The Royal Artillery, the finest military corps in the world, out of 135 men and officers, lost in two years, 51 by death (of whom 35 died at Hong Kong during the last six months of 1843), and 45 by invaliding. That Hong Kong was the cause of their death will be seen from the fact that Colonel Knowles's detachment of the Royal Artillery, went through the whole of the war at Canton, and at the Yang-tse-Kiang River; the detachment was out here three years; it never landed at Hong Kong; one man was killed, and another died of dropsy, but the whole of the remainder of the detachment returned to England except the commanding officer, Lieutenant-colonel Knowles, who landed at Hong Kong, and died of fever.

The officers of the Royal Artillery died in the same proportion as the men; out of nine officers who came out with the original detachment, but one escaped disease or death.

Last year there were severe losses in the ships of war. Her Majesty's ship "Agincourt" lost during the sickly season of 1843, 60 men, of whom 20 were marines; 40 men were invalided home, of whom few would recover. Since leaving England in May 1842, the "Agincourt" has been obliged to enter 160 seamen from merchant ships. The cause assigned for the severe illness of the marines and seamen of last year, was the being obliged to land guards to protect stores at West Point. This year the "Agincourt" sends no men on shore, or on night duty, and out of 600 men there are only 23, including slight hurts, in the sick list. This tests the insalubrity of the shore.

The deaths in the naval force at Hong Kong and Whampoa, for the six sickly months, ending October 1843, were 4 ½ per cent.; while for the same period on shore, the deaths among the troops averaged 24 per cent.; and even among the European civilians, the estimate was 10 per cent.. In May 1843, the left wing of Her Majesty's 55th Regiment had 16 officers and 491 men in Hong Kong; from thence to November, two officers and 218 men died, and the lives of the remainder were only saved by the prompt, judicious, and humane conduct of General D'Aigular, in immediately embarking the men for England.

The mortality as yet (July), during the present year, has not been so great, but the sickness is equally destructive of the efficiency of the troops. Chuck-chew, on the south side of Hong Kong, it was hoped would be a healthy station; on 30th June 1844, out of 400 men of Her Majesty's 98th Regiment at Chuck-chew, there were 109 in hospital. Out of 80 lascars at the same station, there were 30 in hospital.

It was supposed that Saiwan, on the south side of Hong Kong, would afford a healthy station for the troops. Government expended about 30,000 dollars in building and preparing a fine set of barracks, of two stories, with every view to comfort and health. The officer of the Royal Engineers having reported the barracks habitable, the general commanding sent a medical Board to examine the building and station. The Board reported, that the station at Saiwan appeared healthy; that there was no apparent cause for disease, and that it was eligible for troops. The general resolved to begin with a small detachment, and 20 Europeans were sent to Saiwan. No sentry was to be mounted during the day, and but one at night.

In five weeks five of the soldiers were dead, three more were in a dangerous state, and four were convalescent. One European woman and child were also dangerously ill.

The remaining men were withdrawn, and a small detachment of native troops are now (17th July 1844) being sent thither, in order to ascertain whether the climate will suit them.

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them. On the 17th July only four men out of the 20 Europeans were reported fit for duty.

The returns made to the army and naval medical Boards will furnish full information of the sufferings of the soldiers and sailors in Her Majesty's service in this colony.

The Indian troops bear the insalubrity of the climate worse than the Europeans. In the cantonments at the east end of Victoria the 39th Madras Native Infantry, and the 37th Madras Native Infantry, lost nearly half their men in 1842. In 1844 a wing of the 4th Madras Native Infantry landed at Hong Kong 450 men in perfect health, and 53 sick, after a long voyage. There have been already many deaths in the cantonments at the west end of Victoria; and in June 1844 there were 160 men sick, and the list was daily increasing. From 15th April to 2d July 1844, there died at Hong Kong, out of the small force there, 52 Europeans and 42 native soldiers.

General D'Aguilar says, that the maintenance of a garrison at Hong Kong would cost the Crown one regiment every two years. Estimating each soldier as having cost Government 100*l.*, this would be severe economical loss, and worthy of the consideration of those who would not reflect on the humanity of the subject. To keep 700 effective firelocks in Hong Kong, it is necessary to maintain 1,400 men.

Hong Kong is not less fatal to the Chinese, of whom there are on an average about 600 sick and dying monthly. Dr. Gutzlaff says, "of 100 coolies with whom I was acquainted, there died between 20th May and 15th June 1844, 10 men, whilst 30 left the place diseased." I understand that the whole of these 100 strong men from the east coast were obliged to leave the colony from sickness. There is no large town or extensive population on the main land of China adjacent to Hong Kong. Dr. Gutzlaff says, "many Chinese have fallen victims in Hong Kong from a malignant fever, which not only deranges the whole system, but hastens the death of the patient." He adds, "there exists amongst the doctors not one dissentient voice about the fatal tendency of diseases contracted here."

Nor is it during only one period of the year that the island is unhealthy. In the cold season there are agues, low continued fever, diarrhœa, pulmonary complaints, dropsy, rheumatism, and various other diseases, arising from general debility of the system, and the poisonous atmosphere. On the 25th August 1843, the surveyor-general of the colony reported to Government that "the number of interments has been so great (in the European grave-yard) that the enclosure is almost quite full, and the hill behind is so rocky, that it is impossible to dig into it; therefore ere long it will be necessary to provide another place." The surveyor-general stated it would be a difficult thing to select another grave-yard, on account of the rocky and uneven nature of the island.

Let it not be said that the dreadful mortality and sickness of Hong Kong is the result of the newness of the colony, and that all young settlements suffer proportionately. The assertion, if made, is at variance with fact; new colonies, even in the tropics, have not been originally unhealthy. When the West India islands were first colonized they were perfectly healthy, as is proved by the large European population who resorted thither and remained there many years. Calcutta and Bombay are reputed to have been formerly much healthier than they are at present. The Australian colonies were perfectly healthy when founded, and also the Mauritius and St. Helena. I cannot name a single colony that was originally unhealthy, and that subsequently became salubrious. Soldiers, sailors, and civilians, Europeans and natives, women as well as men, residing in every part of Hong Kong, have fallen victims to the climate, and at all seasons of the year.

An extensive study of the subject, and no inconsiderable experience in different climates, induces me to concur in the opinion of Dr. Thompson, the respected head of the medical department of Hong Kong, that the island never will be healthy. Its geological character, and the circumvallation of hills surrounding the town and island, render it a hot-bed of disease, which may be more mitigated one year than another, but which will ever and anon recur with increased violence.

No drainage can obviate this destructive miasm; independent of new roads or buildings, the rain will every year uncover large portions of the hills, washing the putrifying substance down the deep ravines towards the sea, thus generating a fruitful crop of disease.

We shall have to consider in a subsequent part of this report, whether the objects sought or to be obtained by the possession of Hong Kong, are worth the dreadful sacrifice of life which the maintenance of the present establishment entails.

Population and Progress.

Hong Kong was ceded to the British Crown under the seal of the Imperial Minister and High Commissioner Keshen, in January 1841 (*see* Captain Elliot's proclamation, dated Hong Kong, 29th January 1841), promising "full security and protection to all British subjects and foreigners residing in or resorting to the island, so long as they shall continue to conform to the authority of Her Majesty's Government, hereby constituted and proclaimed in and over Hong Kong, &c." By the same proclamation, natives of China were invited to settle in the island, by promising them that they should be "governed according to the laws and customs of China, every description of torture excepted." And by another proclamation, dated Hong Kong, 1841, issued by Sir Gordon Bremer, Commander-in-Chief, and Captain Elliot, Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary, it is declared, "that the island of Hong Kong has now become a part of the dominions of the Queen of England, by clear public agreement between the High Officer of the Celestial and British Courts. The

Chinese

Chinese are hereby promised protection, in Her Majesty's gracious name, against all enemies whatever; and they are further secured in the free exercise of their religious rites, ceremonies, and social customs, and in the enjoyment of their lawful private property and interests." Chinese ships, and merchants resorting to the port of Hong Kong for purposes of trade, are exempt, in the name of the Queen of England, from charges or duty of any kind to the British Government. The remainder of the proclamation consists of further inducements for the Chinese to settle in and trade with Hong Kong.

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A form of government was organised, a chief magistrate, and harbour-master, &c. were appointed; 50 lots of land were sold in June 1841 to Messrs. Jardine, Matheson & Co., Dent & Co., MacVicar & Co., Fox, Rawson & Co., Turner, Lindsay & Co., and various other persons, the annual rent of which amounted to 3,224*l.* Each lot was required to have a building erected within six months, of the appraised value of 1,000 dollars; and a deposit of 500 dollars was required to be lodged with the treasurer as a security for the performance of this engagement. Building commenced with great spirit; the Government spent very large sums of money on the island, and the harbour was filled with ships of war and transports. The island has now had a fair trial of more than three and a half years. We shall inquire what progress it has made in population.

On taking possession of Hong Kong, it was found to contain about 7,500 inhabtants, scattered over 20 fishing hamlets and villages. The requirements of the fleet and troops, the demands for labourers to make roads and houses, and the servants of Europeans, increased the number of inhabitants, and in March 1842, they were numbered at 12,361. In April, 1844, the number of Chinese on the island is computed at 19,000, of whom not more than 1,000 are women and children. In the census are included 97 women slaves, and the females attendant on 31 brothels, eight gambling-houses, and 20 opium shops, &c. It is literally true, that after three years-and-a-half uninterrupted settlement, there is not one respectable Chinese inhabitant on the island. One man of wealth, named Chinam, who had been engaged in the opium trade, came to Hong Kong, built a good house, and freighted a ship. He soon returned to Canton, and died there of a fever and cold, contracted at Hong Kong. It was understood, however, that had he lived he would have been prohibited returning to Hong Kong, the policy of the mandarins on the adjacent coast being to prevent all respectable Chinese from settling at Hong Kong, and in consequence of the hold which they possess on their families and relatives, this can be done most effectually; at the same time, I believe that they encourage and promote the deportation of every thief, pirate, and idle or worthless vagabond, from the main land to Hong Kong. The Rev. Dr. Gutzlaff, who has been engaged in making the recent census,* appended to this report, referring to the fishermen who formed the greater part of the population of the island on our arrival, says, "they are a roving set of beings, floating on the wide face of the ocean with their families; committing depredations whenever it can be done with impunity." "The stone-cutters have been working here for many years before our arrival. The majority of these men are unprincipled. They cannot be considered as domesticated, and are in the habit of going and coming according to the state of trade." "The most numerous class who have since our arrival fixed themselves on the island, are from Whampoa; many of them are of the worst character, and ready to commit any atrocity." The capital of the shopkeepers is very small; the most of them live from hand to mouth, and lead a life of expedients, without principle and self-control." "It is very natural that depraved, idle, and bad characters from the adjacent main and islands, should flock to the colony where some money can be made." Dr. Gutzlaff, whose prepossessions are strongly in favour of the Chinese, concludes this portion of the memorandum with which he has favoured me, as follows: "The moral standard of the people congregated in this place (Hong Kong) is of the lowest description." This observation is fully borne out by the numerous murders, piracies, burglaries, and robberies of every description which have taken place during the last three years, and with almost perfect impunity, for the Chinese are formed into secret societies for the mutual protection of villains, and no man dare inform against another. At this moment (July 1844) the European inhabitants are obliged to sleep with loaded pistols under their pillows; frequently to turn out of their beds at midnight to protect their lives and property from gangs of armed robbers, who are ready to sacrifice a few of their number if they can obtain a large plunder. This state of things was long ago predicted. In the "Canton Register," of 23d February 1841, it was stated, "Hong Kong will be the resort and rendezvous of all the Chinese smugglers; opium smoking-shops and gambling-houses will soon spread; to those haunts will flock all the discontented and bad spirits of the empire; the island will be surrounded by shameens, and become a Gehenna of the waters." Three years have completely fulfilled this prediction, and neither time nor circumstances will now ever alter the character of the place; no Chinese of the humbler class will even bring their wives and children to the colony. He must be a sanguine visionary who expects that Hong Kong will ever contain a numerous and respectable Chinese population. And, as regards the present inhabitants (if a migratory race who are constantly changing deserve that epithet), their diminution by one-half would be satisfactory, for then, a control by registration might be exercised, and life and property be rendered in some degee secure. The daring character of the population, and its worthlessness for all useful civil purposes in the formation of a colony, will be seen in the following incident:

* Not received with this Report.

On the 27th September 1843, the Hon. Major Caine, the chief magistrate, issued a proclamation for pulling down some mat sheds which harboured a gang of ruffians who were nightly

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nightly engaged in plundering the town. In the beginning of October 1843, the Chinese robbers posted a counter proclamation on the gate of No. 1, Market-place, in the chief thoroughfare, declaring that if they left the island themselves, they would "compel others to do so," taking with them their merchandise and property, and warning people to be cautious how they ventured out after dark, lest they met with some unexpected harm;" at the same time, the Government coal depôts were set on fire; the mat barracks of the 41st Regiment, and the Market-place, No. 1, were attempted to be burned; and at noon a number of Chinamen, armed with knives, entered the market-place, threatened all around, wounded an European policeman, and then walked away unmolested. The number of prisoners in the gaol of Hong Kong averaged, during 1843-44, from 60 to 90 a month; nearly every prisoner was Chinese, and the crimes with which they were charged were invariably piracy, murder, burglary, robbery, &c. There has been no diminution of crime; the number of prisoners in the gaol have increased; and the nightly robberies are as frequent, if not more so, than they were three years ago. The shopkeepers do not remain more than a few months on the island, when another set takes their place. There is, in fact, a continual shifting of a Bedouin sort of population, whose migratory, predatory, gambling and dissolute habits, utterly unfit them for continuous industry, and render them not only useless but highly injurious subjects in the attempt to form a new colony. There are no other inhabitants. A few lascars seek employment in ships. The European inhabitants, independent of those in the employ of Government, consist of members of about 12 mercantile houses, and their clerks. A few persons have arrived here from New South Wales to try and better their fortune, many of whom would be glad to return thither.

The principal mercantile firms are those engaged in the opium trade, who have removed hither from Macao, as a safer position for an opium depôt, and which they frankly admit is the only trade Hong Kong will ever possess. The opium belonging to the two principal firms is not, however, lodged on shore, it is kept in "receiving ships," the "Hormanjee Bomanjee," belonging to Jardine, Matheson & Co., and the "John Barry," belonging to Dent & Co. Even the money used by those firms is not entrusted on shore, but is kept in the receiving ships; and the three or four others partially engaged in the opium trade carry on this business in Hong Kong; the tea trade is carried on distinctly at Canton, by members of the firms resident there. Excepting the six firms engaged in the opium trade, the other six houses are small, and are principally agents for manufactures, &c. in Great Britain. The expense of establishments, the high rate of interest on money, and the want of trade, will, it is said, probably ere long compel the removal or breaking up of several of the small houses. There is scarcely a firm in the island but would, I understand, be glad to get back half the money they have expended in the colony, and retire from the place. A sort of hallucination seems to have seized those who built houses here; they thought that Hong Kong would rapidly out-rival Singapore, and become the Tyre or Carthage of the eastern hemisphere. Three years' residence, and the experience thence derived, have materially sobered their views. Unfortunately the Government of the colony fostered the delusion respecting the colony. The leading Government officers bought land, built houses or bazaars, which they rented out at high rates, and the public money was lavished in the most extraordinary manner, building up, and pulling down temporary structures, making zigzag bridle-paths over the hills and mountains, and forming the "Queen's Road" of about three to four miles long, on which about 180,000 dollars have been expended, but which is not passable for half the year. The straggling settlement called Victoria, built along the "Queen's Road," was dignified with name of "city;" and it was declared on the highest authority, that Hong Kong would contain a population "equal to that of ancient Rome."

The Surveyor-general, in an official report to Sir Henry Pottinger of 22 pages, dated 6th July 1843, proposed building an entirely new town or city in the Woonichung Valley (which may be aptly called "the valley of death"), with a grand canal, and many branch canals, &c. &c. &c.; two ranges of terraces of houses, &c. &c., courts of law, and various other offices; acclimatising barracks; additions to the present Government House for the secretaries and personal staff of the Governor, isolated from all other buildings; a space of land to be reclaimed from the sea for a public landing-place, with an esplanade or public walk; "a magnificent promenade of four miles," to be made on ground now covered by the sea, which was to be excluded by a sea wall, at a cost of 35 dollars per lineal yard, exclusive of filling in, &c.; a circular road, over hills and ravines, round the entire island, &c. &c., adapted for carriages, and moving troops with speed and facility to any part of the island where they may happen to be required for the protection of the different villages (these villages, be it remembered, containing nothing but a few hundreds of a thieving, piratical population). I refer to the Government archives for these and other most ridiculous projects, which none but the wildest theorists could have projected or entertained.

On the 17th December 1843, the Surveyor-general laid before Sir Henry Pottinger the elevation of a building for a Government office, &c., "with a front of 360 feet in length by 50 feet in depth, and which would probably cost 30,000 *l.* sterling." There seemed to be the greatest possible desire to spend a large part of the Chinese indemnity money on this wretched, barren, unhealthy, and useless rock, which the whole wealth, energy, and talent of England would never render habitable, or creditable as a colony to the British name.

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In illustration of the mode in which the public money was proposed to be spent, I give the following, which is a portion of the estimate of public works in Hong Kong for 1844, and which Sir Henry Pottinger transmitted to England for approval.

	Dollars.
Completion of Queen's Road from West Point to the east side of Wongnichung Valley	28,000
Ditto, to godowns of Jardine & Co.	15,000
New street formation in Victoria	35,000
Sewers in Victoria	100,000
Value of houses to be removed from Upper Bazaar and other places	25,000
Drainage of Woonichung Valley	7,000
Bridle-path to Saiwan	3,000
New church	35,000
Government House, with suitable office, &c.	70,000
House for Judge	24,000
" Advocate-general	20,000
" Queen's Solicitor-general	20,000
" Colonial Secretary	20,000
" Chief Magistrate	20,000
" Treasurer	18,000
" Land Officer	18,000
" Clerk of the Council	16,000
" Colonial Surgeon	16,000
" Chaplain	16,000
Range of building for Advocate-general, Queen's Solicitor, &c. &c.	100,000
Prison, with house for gaoler, Hong Kong	45,000
Debtors' gaol, Hong Kong	20,000
House of correction, Hong Kong	15,000
Two police stations, north side of island	10,000
Two smaller ditto	4,000
Police station at Chuck-Choo	8,000
Ditto - at Saiwan	3,000
Ditto - at Pock-foo-lum	3,000
Keeping in repair Chuk-choo Road	1,500
	715,500
Contingencies of five per cent.	35,775
	751,275
Consulate at Canton	45,000
Total - - - *Dollars*	796,275

Land Office,
10 February 1844.

(signed) *A. F. Gordon*, Land Officer.

This is but a small portion of the contemplated expenditure; it does not include the formation of streets and roads in Hong Kong, which (on account of the mountainous nature of the island) would cost about 100,000*l.* sterling; it does not include barracks, stores, forts, arsenals, dockyards, wharfs, &c., all projected, and which would cost several millions sterling, before they would be completed.

It is unnecessary to pursue this branch of the service further; sufficient has been said to show the absurd and ruinous projects which were entertained, and the utter failure of the colony in regard to the nature and extent of its population. Notwithstanding the large sums of money expended, the Governor is now obliged to hire a residence which belongs to the late Deputy-governor, Mr. Johnston. The Government offices are in a temporary building, which is falling to pieces; the general commanding has hired an inn for his residence. There is only one small barrack in Victoria, and that has been recently erected; it is not possible to rent a decent house under 150 dollars to 180 dollars per month, above 400*l.* sterling per annum. The church service is conducted in a mat shed; the civil and military officers are glad to get a location, or even a room in any spot on any terms, and the prices of living and of servants, &c. (*see* Documentary Appendix)* are enormous; while the whole population of the island is entirely dependent for its daily supply of food on the Emperor of China's subjects on the main land of China.

* Not received.

Commerce.

There is no trade of any noticeable extent in Hong Kong; vessels occasionally touch here, on their way to Canton, or on their return from thence when laden, and about to proceed to Europe, for orders. Vessels, also, proceeding to or coming from the ports to the northward sometimes touch here for instructions from the owners or consignees, but very few "break bulk" at Hong Kong. There is some business done in opium. Messrs. Jardine, Matheson, & Co. have a large opium "receiving ship," the "Hormanjee-Bomanjee," moored

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moored the whole year round in this harbour; Messrs. Dent & Co. have also a large vessel the "John Barry," for a similar purpose. These receiving ships contain the opium brought from India, whence it is transhipped to smaller vessels, and sent up the coast. Messrs. MacVicar, Burn, & Co., Fox, Rawson, & Co., and a few smaller houses, also deal to the extent of their means in the opium trade, which requires a large ready-money capital. The smaller houses, who have no vessels of their own, consign opium to agents at the consular ports; but it is kept on board the receiving ships, moored off or near those ports, until the agents sell the opium to some Chinese broker at Shang-hai, for instance, who then receives an order for the delivery of the opium from the receiving ship at Woosung, at the entrance of the Yang-tze-Kang River. There are no native trading junks here from the coast of China; there are none belonging to the port; and a few fishing and passage boats, which form a safe asylum for Ladrones and vagabonds of every description, constitute the native craft of Hong Kong. Even if the natural impediments did not exist to the establishment of a native coasting trade, the Articles 13, 14, and 16, in the Supplemental Treaty (*see* Appendix)* would effectually prevent any Chinese junks resorting to Hong Kong. Not only are the junks prevented proceeding thither from any places but the five consular ports, but they must also obtain special passports for a voyage to Hong Kong, and, when arrived there, the British Government are to act the part of spies for the Chinese Government, and to report every vessel, the name of her proprietor, the nature of her cargo, &c., to the authorities at Canton.

* Not received.

It is now well understood what was the object of these clauses; no passes will be readily granted, and junks that might proceed to Hong Kong would probably be punished by the Chinese authorities, who are exceedingly jealous that anything should occur for the advantage of Hong Kong. These and other circumstances, together with the fear of pirates, the want of a Chinese community, the dearness of provisions, and the absence or high price of any trading commodities, will be sufficient to prevent any coasting trade at Hong Kong.

Dr. Gutzlaff, whose knowledge of the Chinese character and proceedings is certainly unsurpassed, says, "So long as the trade is maintained in the respective ports on an excellent footing, no vessels will visit this colony to buy articles at the same price which they can more easily get nearer to them; nor will they bring goods to Hong Kong, for which there is an advantageous market in their own neighbourhood. Where ships find it more profitable to proceed direct to the northern ports, the chances of Hong Kong becoming an emporium are very trifling. Whatever native or foreign trade will be carried on here, must be brought to the colony by adventitious circumstances, and will last or cease according to accident; for notwithstanding the excellent harbour, Hong Kong has nothing in its position or relationship to the other ports to concentrate commerce."

Since August 1841, Sir Henry Pottinger has been issuing proclamations and regulations respecting commerce and shipping for their encouragement and protection. No duties of any kind have been levied, no inquiries have been made as to the cargoes of vessels, ships might enter and depart at pleasure; but all in vain: commerce cannot be created where no materials for it exist.

* Not received.

The table* in the Documentary Appendix shows the shipping which entered the harbour of Hong Kong for three years; it consisted principally of transports conveying troops, and vessels calling for orders or seeking freight. Ample trial has been given to the place without any satisfactory result. Nearly four years' residence on, or occupation of, the island, and an immense expenditure, has failed to produce any commercial operation. Every month the shipping entering the harbour is diminishing, and the imposition of a tonnage duty will, it is said, still further decrease the number.

There does not appear the slightest probability that, under any circumstances, Hong Kong will ever become a place of trade. The island produces nothing whatever; its geographical position, either as regards the Chinese coast generally or Canton in particular, is bad. For the trade of the coast of China it is too far to the southward of a territory which extends upwards of 2,000 miles; and if it were practicable to remove the foreign trade of Canton, the removal would be either to some of the open ports to the northward, in the neighbourhood of the tea districts, or to some island, or place in the Canton river. Among other delusions that have been promulgated, is the allegation that Hong Kong is a protection to the British commerce at Canton, and especially to the tea trade; with reference to the latter it should be remembered, that the Chinese are as eager to sell us tea as we are to buy it; that the cessation of the trade would be a greater injury to them than to the British nation; that there was no difficulty in procuring tea during the war; that nothing would prevent the Chinese supplying our annual demand for tea, and of course receiving in return English manufactures.

The tea trade is, in fact, as independent of Hong Kong as it would be of our occupation of the Sandwich Islands; Canton, however, has no intrinsic advantages to make it the seat of foreign commerce. So long as the Emperor restricted all foreigners to the most distant southerly port in the empire, tea, silk, or any other exportable produce, was obliged to be conveyed thither, however distant the place of production or manufacture; but the case is now totally different, when the northern ports in the immediate vicinity of the tea and silk provinces are equally with Canton open to British commerce; several vessels have already laden with tea for England in the northern ports; this will annually increase, and the trade of Canton will be proportionately diminished, thus rendering Hong Kong (admitting for the sake of argument its reputed value as a protection to the trade of Canton) every year less and less useful to British interests in China. It is for the advantage of England that our trade with China be carried on with the northern ports. In the central districts

districts of China, along the Yang-tze-Kiang, and other great rivers and canals, the people are more civilised, more wealthy, and (now that they are becoming acquainted with the English) more disposed to friendly and commercial intercourse. By purchasing tea and silk near the place of production, the charges of land carriage, fees, &c., will be reduced, and the cost price thus lessened by one-third to the British consumer; on the other hand, the Chinese will be able to purchase at a cheaper rate British manufactures when they are brought by our vessels to their doors. These and other considerations render it a matter of national importance that our trade with China be diffused over several ports, instead of being confined to Canton.

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There are now five ports open on the coast of China to all European, East Indian, and American vessels. There can be no reason why those vessels should establish any trade at Hong Kong, merely to change cargoes from one vessel to another; and if the Chinese government sanction the proposition to allow a vessel to sell part of her cargo at one port, and then proceed to another, or to form bonded warehouses at each port, there will be still less probability of any trade being established here. It is indeed a delusion or a deception, to talk of Hong Kong becoming a commercial emporium, and to liken it to Singapore. The circumstances, and position of Hong Kong and Singapore present no resemblance whatever. Hong Kong is a barren rock producing nothing, not leading to any place, surrounded by no trading or populous communities with various commodities for barter; and disadvantageously situate at the most impoverished extremity of a coast line of 2,000 miles, and which for half the year is only readily accessible in one direction.

Singapore is most advantageously placed at the point of the rich Malayan peninsula, and at the entrance of the Straits of Malacca, which may be considered the high road between eastern and western Asia. It is surrounded by, or lies contiguous to, the most fertile, wealthy, and populous islands and countries in the world. Sumatra, Java, Borneo, Celebes, Maccassar, Penang, Siam, Cochin China, Tonquin, Birmah, &c. The harbour of Singapore is capacious, perfectly sheltered, easy of access from every point of the compass, and never experiencing a tempest. The climate is very salubrious. The island of great beauty and fertility, with an undulating surface, an area of 120,000 acres, all capable of tillage, and of which 20,000 acres are now under the luxuriant and profitable cultivation of sugar-cane, nutmegs, pepper, rice, beetel-nut, gambier, cocoa-nuts, &c. The sugar made by Mr. Ballastier, with a steam-engine, or by Mr. Montgomerie, by water and cattle mills, is equal to any produced in the West Indies; the nutmeg trees are already yielding abundantly; the black pepper produced during the past year amounted to 38,000 piculs (a picul = 133 ⅓ lbs.); the gambier to 85,000 piculs, and there are 100,000 cocoa-nut trees in full bearing; live stock, bread, water, delicious fruit and vegetables of every kind, and at moderate prices, are at all times ready for the shipping; 86 miles of excellent roads have been completed; land is being sold in fee-simple at a minimum and maximum price of five to 10 rupees, or 10 *s.* to 20 *s.* per acre; 50,000 industrious and skilful inhabitants are spreading cultivation in every direction; four companies of sepoys constitute the sole military force of the island, which has not even a fort for its defence; the revenue in 1842, amounted to 509,087 rupees, and the disbursements (including 165,955 rupees for troops, and 49,789 rupees for Bengal and Madras convicts), to 494,029 rupees, leaving a surplus income to the extent of 15,083 rupees; and under the able management of the present Governor, Colonel Butterworth, it is one of the most lucrative possessions of the British Crown.

The remarkably eligible position of Singapore for a commercial emporium, led to its establishment as a British colony by Sir Stamford Raffles in 1821, when there were but a few Malay fisherman on the island, who disputed with the tiger for their occupancy. In one year, the trade of the island amounted to 1,000,000 *l.* sterling; in 1824, to 3,000,000 *l.* sterling; and last year, and indeed for several years, the commerce of the island has averaged 5,600,000 *l.* sterling.

This trade is carried on with many countries; with Great Britain to the extent of 3,000,000 dollars; with Calcutta, 2,800,000 dollars; with Java, 1,500,000 dollars; with foreign Europe, North and South America, Madras, Bombay, Arabia, Ceylon, Penang, Malacca, Birmah, Siam, Cochin China, Manila, with Hainan, Formosa, and the whole coast of China, with Sumatra, Borneo, Rhio, the Molluccas, Mauritius, Australia, &c., traders from all these places, meet by common consent at a central mart close to the equator, and exchange the productions of Asia, for those of Europe and America. It is erroneously supposed, that Singapore has been created by its trade with China, such is not the fact. The total import tonnage of Singapore in 1838-9, in square-rigged vessels was 178,796 tons, of which that from China was 32,860. The native tonnage for the same year was 48,000, of which the Chinese vessels constituted 8,000.

The "Straits' produce" which the Chinese require are brought to Singapore by Malay, and other coasting craft, who would not proceed to the northward, and the proprietors of the Chinese junks with whom time is no object, and who go down the coast to the Eastern Archipelago with one monsoon, and return with the other, prefer the speculation with their varied cargoes, and the visiting of their countrymen at the different islands.

But, sufficient has been stated to show that there is no analogy whatever between Hong Kong and Singapore; and that the geographical, territorial, and commercial advantages which have contributed to the prosperity of Singapore, are totally and entirely wanting, and can never be created at Hong Kong.

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Financial Point of View.

There is no apparent prospect of Hong Kong ever yielding any revenue adequate to more than a very small civil government. The limited size, and rocky nature of the island; the absence of agriculture, manufactures or commerce, and the fluctuating and predatory character of the population, forbid the hope of an income being raised to sustain a regular government establishment on the scale now adopted, and which indeed is far beyond the present or prospective wants of the island community.

Under the most favourable circumstances, there may possibly some years hence be obtained from the rent of the building land from 5,000 *l.* to 7,000 *l.* per annum. The markets, licenses, fines, and fees of every description may realise hereafter about 1,000 *l.* per annum. The levy of a tonnage duty would not yield more than 500 *l.* to 1,000 *l.* per annum, if it did not drive away the ships that now enter the harbour; it is not probable that vessels would pay 6 *d.* per ton, merely to call for orders, when they can lie in Macao Roads, and daily communicate with Hong Kong. A registration or license for each male Chinese, resident on the island, might, if there were a more respectable class of inhabitants in the colony, produce 600 *l.* to 1,000 *l.* a year; neither auction duties, stamps, or any of the other ordinary sources of taxation, would under present circumstances yield any revenue worth consideration.

The idea that the Chinese Government will sanction the introduction of opium into China at a moderate fixed duty, and that a large revenue may then be raised by warehouseing the drug at Hong Kong, must, I think be abandoned, as illusory. The legal admission of opium into China by the Emperor, according to the best information I can obtain, is not at all probable; but even were the traffic in opium legalized, the traders have declared they would not pay any duty in Hong Kong, they can keep their large receiving ships the whole year round in Hong Kong or in any other harbour, or tranship the opium from the vessels which convey the drug from Bengal and Bombay to this place, on board the smaller vessels which proceed along the coast to sell, or deposit it at Whampoa, Namsa, Amoy, Chimmo, Chin-chu, Chusan or Wossung in the "receiving ships," which lie in these bays or stations the whole year round. I will not discuss the question of raising a revenue in Hong Kong from the introduction of opium for smoking in the island, either by farming out the drug, or otherwise, independent of the morality or immorality of the question of the Government deriving an income from a vicious indulgence; so long as the Chinese Government prohibit the introduction of opium, and make its use a capital offence, it would not, to say the least, be seemly of us to encourage the use of this destructive, and poisonous stimulant in Hong Kong.

The total revenue to be expected from this colony in my opinion cannot exceed 10,000 *l.* per annum, and to obtain this amount, several years must elapse under the most favourable circumstances. The per contra side shows an expenditure at this moment for mere civil establishments, salaries, and wages at the rate of 50,000 *l.* per annum, irrespective of the cost of public works, roads, and buildings which is estimated at 50,000 *l.* per annum for several years; independent also of the consular charges of 30,000 *l.* per annum, and the army and navy; the whole showing a yearly drain on the British Exchequer of half a million pounds sterling (see Documentary Appendix.)* And here it may be necessary to remove an erroneous assertion, that this heavy yearly charge is only a portion of the revenue which England derives from the China trade. The revenue which is obtained from tea, is paid by the people of England who buy, and consume the tea. It might as well be said that the West Indies furnished the revenue derived by the British Exchequer from the coffee, and sugar consumed in the United Kingdom. The incidence of taxation is on the last purchaser of the taxed article. The tea merchant in England adds to the invoice cost of the tea bought at Canton, the freight to England, the insurance, interest of money, warehousing, customs duty levied in England, and the fair profits of trade, on every chest of tea he may sell the grocer; who then regulates the price at which he can afford to sell a pound of tea to his customer, who pays the whole charges, taxes and profits to the several parties before he drinks his tea. The revenue derived by the China trade is paid by the people of England; the merchant who carries on the trade does not pay a shilling.

* Not received.

It will be for Her Majesty's Ministers to decide whether, on a review of the whole case, there be any justification for spending half a million sterling annually on this coast. Commodore Chads, C. B., who has had extensive experience for many years in China, is of opinion that England would be wise in not establishing any colony in China. As a general principle, colonies that will not pay at least the expense of their civil government are not worth maintaining. There does not appear any reason why Hong Kong should be an exception to this rule. There is not, as has been fancifully supposed, any analogy whatever between Hong Kong and Gibraltar. Hong Kong commands nothing; a glance at a chart will show that the navigation of the China Seas is perfectly independent of Hong Kong; nay, even the entrance of the Canton River is not controlled by Hong Kong; it is not possible by any outlay of money to make the island a fortress, and its harbour is commanded by the opposite shore of the main land. But supposing several millions were spent in fortifying Hong Kong, and half a million were annually expended for its garrison, the *cui bono* would constantly recur. From a Chinese enemy the island has nothing to apprehend even at present. No European or American state would think of capturing Hong Kong, for it would be valueless to them; and if mere glory were sought by the acquisition, they must be aware the fame would be of short continuance, as troops and ships from India, from Australia,

Australia, and from all our stations eastward of the Cape of Good Hope, would soon recapture the place or starve out the garrison.

But Gibraltar is differently circumstanced; it effectually commands the narrow entrance of the Mediterranean, and, together with the fortress and havens of Malta and Corfu, give England a preponderating power in that great European sea, which is becoming daily of more and more value in our intercourse with the Anglo-Eastern empire; moreover, Gibraltar is a valuable commercial entrepôt; at one period, 1,000,000*l.* sterling of cotton goods were exported through Gibraltar into Spain. As a fortress, Gibraltar is perfect; it is impregnable. The revenue of Gibraltar is fully adequate to its civil government, and averages upwards of 30,000*l.* per annum. The military expenses incurred by garrisoning Gibraltar saves the constant maintenance of a large fleet in the Mediterranean, preserves the balance of power, and materially helps to keep the peace of Europe. The remarks applicable to Gibraltar are also applicable to Malta and the Ionian Islands, both of which stations not only pay their whole civil expenditure without one shilling charge on the British Exchequer, but also contribute a considerable sum annually towards military defences and protection. Both of these places are also entrepôts of a large trade. Every colony of the British empire pays for its own civil government, except small sums which are voted annually in part for the Bahamas, Bermuda, the Falkland Islands, St. Helena, and Heligoland. But all these places are intrinsically valuable; the Bahamas, for the geographical position of their harbours; Bermuda, as a strong fortress and dockyard in the Western Atlantic; the Falkland Islands, for their important position in the Great Southern Ocean, near Cape Horn; St. Helena, as a strong fortress and recruiting station for our numerous ships doubling the Cape of Good Hope in the voyages to and from India, China, and Australasia; and in the event of war, the possession of St. Helena would be of great value to our merchants, and save us a large fleet in the Atlantic. Heligoland, in time of war, is a commercial depôt for the Elbe, and the northern ports of Europe. Its expense is only about 500*l.* a year. Numerous as are the colonies of the British empire, they are each of some utility to England; for their territorial extent as emigration fields to provide employment for a surplus population, for their production of sugar, coffee, corn, cotton, silk, indigo, timber, oil, wood, &c., trading emporiums, or fishing stations. I have in vain sought for one valuable quality in Hong Kong; for there are other good harbours around, and for 200 years we have not found the want of such. I can see no justification for the British Government spending one shilling on Hong Kong.

Religious and Social Influence.

The benefits derivable from our laws, institutions, and religion can never be conferred on the Chinese by our colonization of Hong Kong.

We are here, in fact, almost as much isolated from China, its people, and supreme government, as if we were located in the Eastern Archipelago. By the adroit policy adopted by the Chinese authorities, a "cordon sanitaire," if I may so express it, has been drawn round Hong Kong. No Chinaman is permitted to come here willingly, except he be a thief, a pirate or a spy. No respectable Chinese with their families, locate themselves in Hong Kong; if they did, their relations still remaining on the main land would probably be "squeezed," imprisoned, tortured, and considered as traitors to the Celestial Empire.

Hong Kong is viewed by the Chinese as a spot where adventurers and reckless characters may make something out of the English, and where burglars and robbers may resort with impunity, and live upon the profits of their villany.

I am strongly of opinion, from circumstances that have come to my knowledge, that the mandarins view with indulgence all vagabonds who propose to quit their own country and proceed to Hong Kong; that, in fact, direct encouragement is afforded them to do so. It is, therefore, the height of improbability to suppose that the possession of Hong Kong will ever enable us to disseminate our religion, language, and institutions in the Chinese empire. For 200 years we have had extensive and profitable intercourse with Canton, without our missionaries and other good men ever producing the slightest effect on the people or government. The inhabitants of the southern districts are decidedly hostile to us, and are daily becoming more and more filled with a deadly animosity, which the possession of Hong Kong will not remove. No converts are made by our missionaries on this island; but, were such the case, no converts from Hong Kong would be favourably viewed by the respectable Chinese on the main land. The Christian converts would be considered as coming from an island of thieves and pirates; they would be received with a suspicion which would check rather than advance the progress of Christianity. The missionaries with whom I have conversed, take this view of the subject. They consider it hopeless to attempt the spread of Christian doctrines in China by means of converts from Hong Kong. Thus, in a religious aspect, Hong Kong is as valueless as it is on financial and commercial grounds.

Were our colonial authority and establishment at some island or position to the north, near the central regions of China, we should most probably obtain considerable moral influence over an intelligent and respectable class of Chinese, who would communicate their favourable ideas to other and distant parts of the empire, and by extending a knowledge of our language, pave the way for the introduction of Christianity. An English city at Chusan, for example, surrounded by an extensive agricultural population (the best disposed and most orderly in China, as well as elsewhere), and evincing all the benefits of the science and skill of Europe, would have a remarkable effect on the Chinese, whose in-

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quisitiveness and imitative powers would soon induce them to copy those things which would conduce to their physical, and, ultimately, to their moral and religious improvement.

In a Political Point of View.

Hong Kong was occupied by our troops and merchants in 1840-41, at a period when our trade was driven from Canton, when we were in hostility to the Chinese Government, and when the Portuguese authorities at Macao had expressed their inability to permit, as usual, British residence and resort to that port. At this period, the views of Captain Elliot were solely directed towards Canton. Hong Kong was then deemed the most eligible spot for British occupation on political and military grounds; and so it proved, as long as the operations were being directed against Canton, aud we were excluded from China, but on our proceeding to the northward, occupying Chusan, and ultimately making peace and opening five ports (including Canton) for free commercial resort, English residence, and the establishment of a ship of war at each port, the political and mercantile value of Hong Kong entirely ceased. The late war has shown us the vulnerable point of China, namely, the Yang-tze-Kiang River, which is aptly denominated by the Chinese the "Girdle of the Empire." In the event of any future hostilities, our force would be directed at once toward Nankin, and other places on the Yang-tze-Kiang River, and not against Canton. It is by interrupting the supplies of grain and salt to Pekin, and cutting off the trade of the great artery or canal, that we can with the least expenditure of blood or treasure terminate hostilities with China.

To accomplish this most desirable result, Hong Kong is utterly valueless; our position must be Chusan, from its contiguity to the seat of war, from its comparative salubrity, safe haven, and capability of supplying provisions both from the resources of the island itself, and from the contiguous coasts. A fleet of ships of war and transports may rendezvous at Chusan, and select at will the most fitting period of the year for offensive operations; no attack need be apprehended from the Chinese; coal is abundant in the Yang-tze-Kiang for the use of steamers; ships from Singapore and the southward can now, by reason of a greater knowledge of the winds and currents, reach Chusan even against the monsoon, in nearly the same time they would occupy in reaching Hong Kong; and, finally, the Chinese Government, aware of our position, would be the less disposed to break the peace, and would cease to rely so much as they do now, on the strength of the forts in the Canton River. The policy of the Chinese Government is to keep foreigners at the extremity of the empire; but the sagacious reasons which dictate this policy ought to render us more anxious to operate in a counter direction. There are now seven fortifications, very strong and apparently well provided with artillery at the Bogue; with Chinese gunners, these forts would prove even at present formidable to an invading force, but well manned by European or American artillerymen, the Bogue would be almost as impregnable as the Dardanelles.

On a review of the whole case, there are no assignable grounds for the political or military occupancy of Hong Kong, even if there were no expense attending that occupancy. The Government of China is sufficiently civilised to respect the persons and property of British subjects at Canton before any declaration of war took place (which, however, is an event of very remote probability for many years to come), and as the treaty with China provides for the stationing of a ship of war at Whampoa or Canton, a better security is thus provided for any British residents at Canton than Hong Kong could afford. The climate of Hong Kong will not admit of the island being a garrison for troops, and in the event of another war with China, an invading army must proceed from India; but a very small effective force can be maintained here unless at an enormous expense, and the impracticability of fortifying an island which is commanded by the hills around, and by any large battery erected on the opposite shore, is now generally acknowledged, and is in further corroboration of the inutility of Hong Kong. On a review of the whole question, and examining the island in all aspects, making every allowance for the newness of the settlement, and admitting, for argument's sake, that ultimately there may be some trade at Hong Kong, it appears to me very advisable that if Hong Kong be retained as a British station or colony, that the civil establishment of the colony be cut down to a scale commensurate with the resources and wants of the island, and that the supernumerary officers be provided for in other colonies as vacancies occur; that the European and sepoy troops be removed, and a portion of the 1st Ceylon Regiment (Malays) be kept at Hong Kong in aid of the civil power; that a frigate or sloop of war be always stationed in the harbour, with an extra complement of marines, to be landed only in case of emergency; that the British and other respectable inhabitants who are householders be formed into a municipal body, with power to assess themselves for the police, lighting, drainage, and street-making, &c., of Victoria; that the harbour be a free port, open to ships under every flag; and that encouragement be given for the resort to and settlement on the island of other European nations. If this be done, a few years will determine whether it be possible to create any trade or induce any resort to Hong Kong. Large Government establishments, and an immense outlay of the public money for the last three years, have produced no beneficial result; let the opium traders, and those who choose to resort thither, have a voice in the management of the affairs of the colony. There can scarcely be less general trade, less prosperity, less security to life and property, than now exists with a large garrison on shore and a fleet in the harbour.

If there were any one advantage, political, commercial, financial, or religious, present or prospective, derivable to England from the existing establishment at Hong Kong, there would

would be some justification for the expense now being incurred, and for the great annual sacrifice of life; but when such advantages do not exist, and our occupation and military parade is an eyesore and daily source of annoyance to the Chinese Government (Keying, the imperial commissioner, has now refused to visit Hong Kong), it is worse than folly to persist in a course begun in error, and which, if continued, must eventually end in disappointment and in national loss and degradation. Encl. 1, in No. 1. Report on the Island of Hong Kong.

24 July 1844. (signed) *R. Montgomery Martin.*

Enclosure 2, in No, 1.

(No. 249.)

Sir, Victoria, Hong Kong, 20 August 1844.

I AM instructed by his Excellency the Governor to inform you that he has perused your paper concerning Hong Kong, which you request may be forwarded to Lord Stanley. In doing this, however, his Excellency deems it only right towards you to state, with reference to the contents of that paper, written as it was with the disadvantage of only a few weeks' knowledge of the place, that he could not forward it without passing his own judgment on the incorrectness of many of the facts and conclusions, and the absence of moderation in the style. Encl. 2, in No. 1.

Her Majesty's Government have expressed their high approbation of the several details and representations with which they have been furnished by his Excellency's predecessor, Sir Henry Pottinger, on every point connected with this colony; and some of the expressions in your paper might be construed into reflections on the proceedings of that distinguished personage, which his Excellency could not forward with his sanction.

In copying the Appendix to which you allude, I am directed to draw your attention to the necessity of not occupying the time, or diverting the attention of the clerks in the Treasury Office from their proper duties; and in cases where documents have already been furnished from the different departments, it might be sufficient merely to refer to them.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Frederick W. A. Bruce,*
Colonial Secretary.

R. M. Martin Esq.
&c. &c. &c.

(A true copy.)
(signed) *Frederick W. A. Bruce.*

— No. 2. —

(No. 66.)

No. 2. Right Hon. Lord Stanley to Governor Davis. 17 Dec. 1844.

COPY of a DESPATCH from the Right Honourable Lord *Stanley* to Governor *Davis.*

Sir, Downing-street, 17 December 1844.

I HAVE to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch* of the 20th August last, marked "Separate," enclosing a report drawn up by Mr. Montgomery Martin on the island of Hong Kong, and the expediency, in a political and commercial point of view, of its retention by Great Britain.

* Page 3.

Mr. Martin's opinions on this subject are exceedingly adverse to the retention of Hong Kong, and are supported by arguments to show its unhealthiness, the improbability of raising a local revenue, and its inutility as an entrepôt for trade. In the letter which you addressed to Mr. Martin before forwarding his report, as well as in your despatch to me, you express your general dissent from his views, the inaccuracy of which you attribute to the shortness of his acquaintance with the colony and the enfeebled state of his health. Considering, however, the nature of the facts alleged by Mr. Martin, and the opportunities which from his position he enjoyed of forming an opinion on points connected with the finances of Hong Kong, Her Majesty's Government are anxious, before proceeding further, to receive from you a specific report as to the points on which you dissent from Mr. Martin's facts and opinions. It is evident that unless that gentleman's statements and views be altogether incorrect, they afford ample motive for deliberation before Her Majesty's Government authorise the incurring the very large civil and military expenditure which has been proposed in contemplation of Hong Kong becoming a permanent British settlement, the resort of a large population, both European and Asiatic, and the centre and principal seat of an extensive and valuable commerce.

I have, &c.
(signed) *Stanley.*

— No. 3. —

(No. 44.)

No. 3.
Governor Davis to the Right Hon. Lord Stanley.
25 April 1845.

COPY of a DESPATCH from Governor *Davis* to the Right Honourable Lord *Stanley*.

Victoria, Hong Kong, 25 April 1845.

My Lord, (Received, 2 August 1845.)

IN despatch* No. 66, of the 17th December, your Lordship desires me to furnish a report as to the points on which I dissent from the views stated by Mr. Martin in a paper of observations which I forwarded at that gentleman's request.

* Page 15.

His objections to Hong Kong are founded on an apprehension of its peculiar unhealthiness, the improbability of raising a local revenue, and its inutility as an entrepôt for trade. I shall endeavour to show that his statements were exaggerated and partial, and I am still of opinion that Mr. Martin wrote under a feeling of strong prejudice, founded in apprehensions for his personal health, regarding which he is remarkably sensitive, and on account of which he has had more leave of absence than any individual in the service. Your Lordship will have observed in that gentleman's paper, that he suggests the expediency of his being provided for in some other colony.

With reference to the first point, that of imputed unhealthiness, I consider the climate of Hong Kong to be precisely that of Macao, from which it is only 40 miles distant, and where for many years I and numbers of others enjoyed as good health as in England. In its geological features it is identical, though the hills are higher. Major Caine, now the oldest resident in Hong Kong (from its very first possession), states it to be better than any part of India, and Sir Henry Pottinger will say the same. But as the mere statement of opinions is hardly sufficient, I will endeavour to show that the great mortality among the military and (at the very first) among civilians must be attributed to circumstances and causes sufficiently obvious to save the character of the climate.

Before the place was definitively declared, only two years since, to be a permanent possession of the British Crown, the uncertainty of tenure, and the very limited resort of tolerable workmen, led to persons of all ranks being housed in dwellings progressing gradually from mere mat sheds to wooden and brick hovels of a somewhat better description. The pernicious system of ground-floor apartments was at first universal, arising partly from hurry and partly from economy, and I regret to say that many more of these still remain than I could wish.

With regard to the military, the reports which your Lordship perused from the officers commanding native regiments in respect to the accommodations of the soldiery, were by no means exaggerated. In a remarkably stormy (though not unhealthy) climate, the mat huts of the men on the wet ground withstood neither wind nor rain, and the deplorable condition of things which I found on my arrival led me immediately to acquiesce in the request of Major-general D'Aguilar that he should appropriate the ground on the side of the road opposite to the "North Barracks" to the construction of permanent and proper accommodation for the troops. These are now in a far state of advancement.

To prove that climate must not be rashly assumed as the cause of mortality among the soldiery, I may cite Chusan in 1840. The mortality then and there was appalling, and, from obvious causes: but the island has since proved so congenial to Europeans, that it is the theme of Mr. Martin's admiration and envy, and to the vituperation of Hong Kong he adds the recommendation that Chusan should be retained. I do not say that (for a great many reasons) I should not rather have kept Chusan than Hong Kong at the settlement of the convention, but, if the Chinese fulfil their engagements, I do not see how this is now to be done.

As the lodgment of all classes improves in this colony, I will pledge myself for the improvement of the general health. During the last summer the civil portion of the population were as healthy as in most other countries, and particular cases could be traced to bad dwellings or the too early occupation of new houses.

houses. The enclosed return from Dr. Dill will show very few deaths in proportion to cases under his treatment, viz. 9 in 367. The comparative casualties among the military (which I further enclose) demonstrate a considerable improvement in the last year, under very unfavourable circumstances.

* * * * * *

My chief hopes for the military are founded in the near completion of the excellent and ample quarters for both officers and men, under Major Aldrich's supervision; and when these are occupied, I have little doubt of this climate being found superior to that of most hot countries.

On the second point, the improbability of raising a revenue, I may observe that Mr. Martin (who, in his peculiar province of treasurer, predicted that more than 5,000 *l.* could never be raised on the land) was singularly contradicted at the close of the same year, when the total amount of the leases reached nearly 13,000 *l.* I have no doubt of his views proving, in due time, to be equally fallacious as to other items of revenue; but the greater part of the population were only building their houses, and a too rapid attempt to lay on imposts in an incipient state of things might discourage settlers and do serious injury.

The progress made during the last winter is quite striking; numbers of really fine houses have risen in all directions, and, as roads and communications are completed, and the surveys carried out, the capabilities of the place, with all its natural difficulties, will altogether surpass the first expectation.

With reference to the third question, the prospects of commerce, it is clear that a place which has no productions can exchange nothing in trade; but the finest harbour in the world (as many naval officers pronounce it), and a free port, must render it in time a great entrepôt. It is especially available for warehousing goods. Even as to native produce, the numerous valleys on the south side (by far the finest part of the island), to which a road has been nearly completed, will eventually contribute to the support of the population; and there is abundant pasture, with innumerable streams, over the whole island.

On one point, the trade in Chinese vessels, I fear that Article XIII. of the Supplementary Treaty has inflicted an injury that nothing but a fresh convention can remedy. As long as our own trade is confined to five ports, it is obvious that the Chinese merchants at those ports will not resort to Hong Kong for what comes to their own doors; but had the whole coast of China been left free to the Chinese themselves, a strong inducement to trade with this colony would have existed, and tended to counteract the restriction on Europeans.

This was foreseen and inculcated in the instructions from the Foreign Office, dated 3d February 1841, as I find them in my archives: "You are authorized to propose a condition that if there be ceded to the British Crown an island off the eastern coast of China to serve as a commercial station for British subjects, the Chinese merchants and inhabitants of all the towns and cities on the coast of China shall be permitted by the Chinese Government to come freely, and without the least hindrance and molestation, to that island, for the purpose of trading with the British subjects there established."

Another obstacle to the trade in Chinese vessels has existed in the prevalence of piracy, and this was aggravated by an order issued to our men-of-war that they should never molest a pirate, "except in the act of attacking a British vessel," the most improbable contingency, and especially in the presence of Her Majesty's ships. I have been overwhelmed with applications from our own Chinese subjects, and others resorting to the island, to protect them from the pirates who have almost blockaded the harbour; and my correspondence on the subject with your Lordship and Lord Aberdeen will have shown the extent of the evil. The circumstance of licences to carry arms being found on board piratical vessels, seemed to warrant the inference that they received some encouragement from the Chinese Government to molest our trade; but the disavowal of Keying deprives them of any protection from these licences, and converts the latter into a means of condemnation. A small steamer is one of the best instruments for the capture of pirates, and I have accordingly the "Medusa" now ready for that service.

No. 3.
Governor Davis to the Right Hon. Lord Stanley.
25 April 1845.

Time alone is required for the development of this colony, and for the correction of some evils which may have hindered its early progress. Even now, however, the town of Victoria, which has scarcely existed three years, is fast gaining on Macao, which has been established three centuries. Our merchants have all abandoned the latter place, to which they were for some time attracted by the superiority of the dwellings.

Under any circumstances, this colony will always exercise a most important check on the Chinese Government. While under the influence of guarantees I have little fear as to the fulfilment of its engagements; but the negociations of Captain Elliot glaringly proved that good faith is no inherent or constitutional part of the Chinese character; and when Chusan has been given up, and some less well informed negociator has taken Keying's place, an independent British colony in the neighbourhood may be found to possess other advantages than those of mere commerce, to the protection and promotion of which it will be subservient.

I have, &c.
(signed) *J. F. Davis.*

Enclosure 1, in No. 3.

Encl. 1, in No. 3.

ABSTRACT of Government Officers, Police, &c., Sick and Dead, for Six Months from 1st July to 31st December 1844.

1844.	Government Officers.		Police, &c.		Prisoners.		REMARKS.
	Number on the Sick List.	Number Dead.	Number on the Sick List.	Number Dead.	Number on the Sick List.	Number Dead.	
July -	19	–	50	3	7	1	Two policemen died of fever and one of dysentery; one Chinaman died of ulcers on the legs.
August -	10	–	34	1	8	1	One policeman died of fever, and one Chinaman of ulcers on the legs.
September	17	–	36	1	8	–	One corporal of police injured in an affray while on duty. Removed to hospital of 98th Regiment, where he died. (*Vide* Coroner's Inquest.)
October -	17	–	44	2	3	–	One policeman died of fever, and one of diseased liver.
November	12	–	38	–	–	–	
December	16	–	47	–	1	–	
Total -	91	–	249	7	27	2	Total Deaths, 9.

Deaths which could not be entered in the above list, one on the 31st July. (Mr. T. J. Scales).

(signed) *F. Dill,*
Colonial Hospital Surgeon.

Victoria, Hong Kong, 24 January 1845.

W. Arrowsmith, Lithe.

No. 148. Ordered, by the House of Commons, to be Printed, 21st March 1857.

Harry Hansard, Printer

Enclosure 2, in No. 3.

COMPARATIVE DEATHS among the Military to the strength of the Force, during the Years 1843 and 1844. Encl. 2, in No. 3.

		DEATHS.
1843. Total strength European troops - - - -	925	373
„ Ditto - - Native - ditto - - - - -	596	67
	1,521	440
1844. Total strength European troops - - - -	1,387	216
„ Ditto - - Native - ditto - - - - -	901	157
	2,288	373

— No. 4. —

No. 4.
Report on the Island of Chusan.

REPORT on the Island of CHUSAN.

CHUSAN, or "Chowsan," so called in Chinese from its resemblance to a boat, is the chief insular settlement of an archipelago of lofty islands, varying in size and fertility, which extend upwards of 60 miles from north to south, and about 50 miles from east to west; distant from the Kitto Point or main land of China about seven miles, and about 40 miles distant from Ningpo. Tinghae, the capital of Chusan, is in 30° 10′ north latitude, and 122° 14′ east longitude.

The length of the island is about 23 miles from east to west, and the breadth from north to south 7 to 11 miles. The circumference is about 150 miles.

The two principal bays are those of Tinghae on the southern and Singkong on the western coast of Chusan. There are, however, several other bays and harbours. Tinghae or Chusan bay or harbour is land-locked, and has three good entrances: 100 sail of square-rigged vessels may anchor with ease in the inner harbour of Chusan, although the adjacent anchorages are equally safe (*see* Maps accompanying). The rise and fall of tide is 12 feet 6 inches, and the average depth of harbour is 4 to 10 fathoms. There is a good position for docks and a dock-yard, which are so much wanting in the China Seas. Singkong bay or strait is six miles in length, with an average breadth of 700 yards. There are two entrances of easy access at the north and south extremities of the bay, which is well sheltered, and affords excellent anchorages for ships of war or for vessels of large burthen. Good water is plentiful. There is an admirable site for a large dock-yard.

The highest elevation of the island is at its eastern extremity, where one peak rises to 1,100 feet above the sea; the average height of the hilly portion is from 500 to 700 feet.

Chusan consists of numerous ranges of hills, with broad intervening vallies; every range is connected with spurs or buttresses, assuming the most varied forms, and appearing as if of diluvian origin, many parts at no great distance of time having been left dry by the receding ocean.

Some of the vallies are from eight to nine miles long, and present one continuous scene of rich cultivation. The mountains and hills, wherever there is any soil on the surface, are terraced, and cropped with different useful vegetables. Wheat, tea, grass cloth plant, sweet potatoes, cotton, tobacco, and rice may be found on the same side of a mountain, the water collected on the top being permitted to descend from the different terraces until it is deposited in the rice field at the bottom of the mountain. In some parts the mountains are planted with fir, while the Spanish chesnut, walnut, tallow, and varnish trees adorn and enrich

No. 4. Report on the Island of Chusan.

the lowlands. Canals, some 20 feet wide, are very numerous, and kept always flowing by means of the locks and of the numerous streams of fine water which fall from the hills, sometimes in beautiful cascades. The canals are used to mark the boundaries of property, as well as for irrigation. One large canal, southward and eastward of Tinghae, admits junks of considerable burthen a good way into the north valley, and adjacent to the gates of the city, at the rise of the tide, which is 12 feet 6 inches (*see* Map). The whole island is intersected by substantial paved or flagged roads, about 5 feet to 7 feet broad, slightly elevated above the adjacent fields, but which at little expense might be widened to admit of wheeled carriages. At present, everything is borne on the shoulders of men; but the unshod horse traverses the roads with celerity.

The towns and villages are scattered pretty equally over the whole island. In the valley of Tachin is a very large unwalled town, with a river running through it.

The whole island is admirably irrigated; the water which flows from the hills is very pure, and conduits might readily be constructed to bring abundance of water into Tinghae, instead of relying on the wells, which are said to be brackish, and a cause of diarrhœa.

One-third of the island is said by Lieutenant Sargent to be cultivated. Dr. Gingell, 2d Madras Native Infantry, the Chinese interpreter, says that 135,000 mows of land are under cultivation with grain. Reckoning the mow as equal to an English rood, this would give 33,750 acres, producing chiefly rice. When we consider that two crops of rice and one of oil seed are obtained annually from the land (the October rice crop growing up while the August rice crop is being reaped), the amount of corn production must be considerable. As well as I could ascertain, I am led to conclude that the agricultural produce of the island is sufficient to feed all its inhabitants throughout the year. The quantity of garden vegetables grown is very great; the soil, stimulated by the constant application of liquid manure (of which large earthen jars are kept at the corner of every field and garden), increases the size, but diminishes the flavour of the different products which are grown in rapid succession, the earth being never allowed to lie fallow.

The constant garden cropping, the deep green of the large rice plains, and the cultivation climbing the hills, give great beauty to the scenery; and at early morn, the singing of the birds in the groves, the murmuring rivulets through the vallies, and the fresh breeze from the mountains, enhance the charms of the landscape, and renovates the health of the debilitated resident of a tropical climate.

Were Chusan a British colony, its hills and vales would be adorned by charming villas, rich orchards, and luxuriant pasturages. An English town with all the advantages of modern civilization, would become an example to the Chinese, and in the improvement of our position we should materially aid in the social advancement of the imitative nation contiguous to our shores.

Tinghae city, in length from north to south about 1,200 yards, and in breadth about 1,000, is surrounded by a stone wall of two miles and three-quarters in length, nearly 15 feet in height, 13 feet in thickness, surmounted by a strong brick parapet of four feet and a half high and two feet thick, with small embrasures for matchlocks or arrows. The gateways, four in number, east, west, north, and south, are double, and placed in zigzag as in India. At intervals around the walls are strong square bastions, well placed. At the western side of the city the wall ascends a steep mound, now called the "Cameronian Hill" (the 26th Regiment being encamped there after the first attack on the island). Part of this hill is therefore included within the city bounds. A canal (*see* Map) 33 feet wide by three deep runs parallel to the city wall about 30 yards distant, except at the "Cameronian Hill," and enters near the south gate; the level space at each side of the city walls is covered with rice fields, almost continually under water, and of difficult passage to an invading force. The flat country around is a succession of rice fields, bordered with the lofty Barbadian millet, which rises 10 feet in height.

The city of Tinghae is extensive, and, like all Chinese towns, the streets are narrow, irregular, and flagged with large slabs of different kinds of stone. Almost every street has a covered drain which communicates with a canal. For a Chinese city it is kept extremely clean. The houses are generally of one story, but the tenements of the richer classes are very extensive, and form three sides

of

of a square, with a lofty wall in front. Sometimes there are two or three inner courts. The shops are numerous, and there is a minute division of employment. In many respects there is a resemblance to the tradesmen of Europe. Persons of the same trade frequently congregate in the same street or neighbourhood. The shops have a long and broad counter, effectually separating the purchasers from the shopmen, with a money-till at one end. There are neatly labelled drawers, or commodious shelves and back warehouses, for the ready disposition of the goods. A reel of twine hangs from the ceiling, close to wrapping paper cut of various sizes ready for use. In front of the shop, or hanging partly on the outside, are varieties of such goods as may attract the notice of customers, with the prices affixed on labels, in some instances in such characters as are only known to the shopmen. Everything is sold by weight. The artisans are extremely expert. Silversmiths in Tinghae now make spoons, forks, goblets, branch candlesticks, and various other articles of domestic use. The tailors are excellent and cheap workmen, and to the English are known by their respective cognomens of Stultz, Nugee, &c. The supply of every article of provision, including meat, poultry, fish, vegetables, fruit, groceries, &c. is most abundant, and not one-half the price of very inferior articles at Hong Kong, where, indeed, it is often impossible to get beef or mutton of any description. Let but an European want be known in Chusan, and it will be very extraordinary if it be not supplied by a Chinaman. An European or Indian soldier is stationed at each gate of the city, but no difficulty is interposed and no tax levied on perfect freedom of ingress or egress to or from the city. Many of the European officers, including that distinguished officer Brigadier Campbell, the commandant of Chusan, reside in various parts of the city perfectly isolated from each other, and with as much confidence and security as if they were residing in an English town. A part of the 2d Madras Native Infantry are quartered in the city, and their "Place d'Armes" is a remarkable temple, filled with numerous human figures of full size, admirably carved in wood, painted, and representing the human countenance and form in every expression and attitude of passion and affection—of grief and joy—of sensibility and intelligence. I have seen nothing equal to the artistic skill and true taste exhibited in this temple in any other part of China. The inhabitants do not seem to take umbrage at its occupation by our troops, who scrupulously preserve it from injury.

Her Majesty's 18th Regiment are quartered outside the city, in some two-storied houses which face the sea, close to an extensive bund or embankment, which was erected with marvellous rapidity during the period which intervened between our first and second occupation of the island in 1840–41. This bund extends for nearly three miles along the sea front of Tinghae and Chusan harbour, and forms a fortified earth wall pierced at short and regular intervals for cannon; and during our second attack on the island, about 150 pieces of artillery of various calibre (many of them, however, unserviceable) were placed in the embrasures. The bund now forms an excellent promenade for the garrison. The parade of the 18th Regiment is large, dry, level, and in the midst of the barracks, officers' quarters, and commissariat naval stores. Contiguous to the parade our Government have built an excellent two-storied hospital facing the sea, at an expense of about $10,000 (ten thousand dollars).

The European artillery are quartered in comfortable barracks on Joss-house Hill (*see* map), where a few guns command the whole harbour, the city, and the surrounding plain.

Geology.

Chusan appears to have been upheaved by a sub-marine convulsion, or to have been left dry by the receding ocean. A porphyritic claystone, assuming in some places a columnar, and in others, a laminated structure, appears to constitute the main portion of the island. Occasionally, a compact porphyritic stone of coarse conglomerate, capable of being split into large slabs or formed into pillars, is found and quarried for various purposes. The soil in the vallies is a rich, dark, alluvial mould. There is no limestone on the island. None of the rotten granite found at Hong Kong or Amoy, and which yields such a deleterious gas, is perceivable at Chusan. About the centre of the island, and at the height of 700 feet, our surveyors found the compass vibrate so much, that it became useless. The same vibration was observed on the high land at the eastern extremity of Chusan.

No. 4.
Report on the Island of Chusan.

Climate.

In this respect Chusan may be said to vie with the most favoured regions of the earth. It is the Montpellier of China. There are only three months in the year which can be called hot; June, July, and August. Fires are sometimes kept up till the middle of June, and woollen clothing is worn for nine months. The cold weather sets in about the middle or end of September; but the average duration of hot weather does not exceed three months. The remainder of the year is cold, bracing or genial, according to the season; even during the hottest season the thermometer in a good house, facing the harbour, ranges from 80° to 86° Fahrenheit, very seldom approaching 90°, and frequently descending at night to 78°. The average of the month of August is about 83° (*see* accompanying Meteorological Register for June, July, and August, 1844, kept at Lieutenant Skeid's, the harbour-master). In September, the mercury descends to 74°; and in the early part of October the cold weather season is established; the thermometer stands at 49° to 59° at sunrise, towards the end of the month. In November the north wind is piercingly cold and bracing. In December the temperature is still further reduced; the ground is covered with a hoar frost; ice of half an inch thick is general in the plains. In January the thermometer falls to 20° F.; there is a clear, bracing, azure atmosphere; snow falls frequently, and remains on the East Peak two feet deep for ten days. February is like January. In March the vicissitudes are great; thermometer 27° at night; days hot. Hills around snow-capped. April, easterly winds; sun breaking forth with increasing heat. May, ditto, but fires still necessary to the European.

The climate of Chusan is far more favourable to health than that of either Ningpo or Shanghae, or even of stations further north. The Roman-catholic missionaries say that they are unable to stand the climate and excessive heat of those cities, and that no European can remain there with impunity for a few successive years. Our troops suffered greatly up the Yang-tze-Keang river in 1842. Thirteen men of the 98th Regiment dropped dead from the heat of the sun. Fever and ague, dysentery, diarrhœa and cholera, were rapidly destroying our soldiers and sailors off Nankin. The whole northern region of the Yang-tze-Keang, of the Yellow River, and of the Peihoo, is a flat, marshy country, inundated as rice fields, or covered with water for a great part of the year, and subject to intense solar heat for about five months, without any mountain or sea-breezes to temper the atmosphere. Chusan has a constant sea-breeze at Tinghae during the summer months, from the S.W. monsoon; and the varied forms of its mountains and vallies, produce a continued change of renovating airs. The thermometer rises at Shanghae to 107° F. in the shade; at Ningpo nearly as high, and at Chusan, at Lieutenant Skeid's, the harbour-master, it rarely rises to 86° F. Invalids from Shanghae and Ningpo, as well as from Hong Kong, Canton, and Amoy, seek and find health at Chusan. It is of the utmost importance to us to have a healthy station on the coast of China, where our troops can be located and found always ready for active service. A regiment from Hong Kong could not endure the fatigue and exposure of one week in the Yang-tze-Keang district. A regiment from Chusan would be found as effective for service as any regiment in the United Kingdom, and might be marched to Pekin, if necessary.

An ice-house is open at Chusan from 1st June to 1st September. The daily consumption in July is about 800 lbs. a day by the English subscribers of five rupees each; they pay also about one farthing a pound for the ice, which is collected in winter by a Chinaman from the canals around, and deposited in a mud-walled house with a high thatched roof. Conduits carry off the melted ice outside the building. Dry straw is thickly strewed over the ice. The Chinese use ice extensively for preserving fish.

Health of the Troops.

The state of the artillery stationed at Chusan, compared with the dreadful mortality of the artillery stationed at Hong Kong (*see* my Report on Hong Kong), is very remarkable. There landed at Chusan of the Madras European Artillery, in November 1842, after going through the whole campaign, 1 captain, 1 lieutenant, 1 bugler, 3 corporals, 4 bombardiers, and 49 gunners; total, 62. To these must be added three more, who rejoined from Hong Kong in April 1843, and six from Madras in November 1843. The deaths up to August 1844 were only five; viz.,

viz., four gunners and one bombardier. The mortality may be considered at less than two per cent. per annum. The men are in the most efficient order, and as ready for active service as if they had been stationed at Woolwich the last two years.

Four companies of Her Majesty's 18th (Royal Irish) Regiment have been stationed at Chusan since the conclusion of the war, after being engaged in all the campaigns, and they have not lost by death one per cent. per annum. That portion of the 18th which returned from Amoy were very sickly.

The admissions into the Chusan Hospital for Europeans, from 1st January to 31st July 1844, were 461, including 104 siphylitic cases; of these, but six died.

Of 60 officers who have resided at Chusan for the last 18 months, not one has died.

The contrast between the men of Her Majesty's 18th Regiment stationed at Hong Kong, Koolungsoo (Amoy), and Chusan, is very striking. Out of 500 men of the 18th Regiment stationed at Koolungsoo in 1843, there died 75 men and two officers; the remaining men were perfect skeletons, and unable to shoulder a musket. Out of the same strength and in the same period of time, at Chusan, in 1844, the 18th Regiment only lost two men.

During the year 1843 the mortality of the troops at Chusan was only 1 in 29 ½, or about 3 per cent., at Koolungsoo 1 in 12 ½, and at Hong Kong 1 in 3 ½, or nearly 30 per cent.

The invaliding was in the same proportion at these stations. The mortality of Her Majesty's 98th Regiment at Hong Kong is, on an average, about one man a day.

The appearance of the troops on parade in Chusan is that of men in robust health; they have a colour on their cheeks, an elastic and firm step, and in performing their martial evolutions there is an alacrity and precision observable, as if the men took a pleasure in carrying a combined movement into operation, and which is in vain sought in the evolutions of the troops at Hong Kong, where the men seem to stagger under the weight of their knapsack, musket, and accoutrements.

The Indian troops die like "rotten sheep" at Hong Kong; but at Chusan their mortality is not two and a half per cent. per annum, as shown by the following return of a regiment which served in the Chinese campaign.

STATE of the 2d Madras Native Infantry at *Chusan*, in One Year.

MONTHS.	Strength of the Regiment.	Admitted into Hospital.	DIED.	
August 1843	867	53	- none.	Twenty-one men died in one year out of a strength of more than 830 men, which is only about 2 ½ per cent.
September -	867	33	3	
October -	834	75	2	
November -	865	56	3	In 1843 there was only one man invalided. The men look very strong and healthy.
December -	833	39	2	
January -	824	29	2	
February -	823	32	- none.	
March -	821	35	2	
April - -	818	30	5	
May - -	813	35	1	
June - -	681*	34	- none.	
July - -	678*	40	1	

Numerical strength of the officers, 26; none died. The prevailing diseases have been mild ague and diarrhœa.

The regiment has been perfectly effective since it arrived in the latter end of 1842.

* Detachments sent to Koolungsoo (Amoy), to relieve Her Majesty's 18th, who were dying fast.

R. M. Martin.

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It is true that the troops suffered considerably from sickness on their first occupation of Chusan. But instead of the health which now prevails, there would be as much sickness in 1844 as there was in 1841, if the same system were adopted. Instead of the soldiers being located, as at present, in good Chinese two-storied houses on the sea-shore, they were encamped in the wet plains and rice fields, and on the side of a hill to the westward of the city. Numerous posts and guards were established in the burning heat of August. Her Majesty's 26th Regiment, or "Cameronians," were the principal sufferers. They were encamped on the hill to leeward of the city and all its filth. They had no camp-followers, and were obliged to go more than a mile through the city to the Commissariat for their food, which, when obtained, consisted of Calcutta-cured meat perfectly green with putridity, and Calcutta-made biscuit, crumbled into dust with maggots and weavils. It was impossible to eat such food; the dogs even rejected it. The men, worn out with hunger and thirst, and harassed with numerous guards and constant alarms, drank profusely of the almost stagnant water in the canals that flow through the rice fields around the city; and every green thing or unripe fruit which could be obtained was eaten with avidity. Large quantities of the fiery spirit termed "samsho" were easily procured, and it is not to be wondered that dysentery (no fever appeared) soon made dreadful ravages in the 26th Regiment. The conduct of the commanding officer and of those who had the charge of issuing provisions to the troops, was most reprehensible. There were at least 35 officers with the regiment, and only one died, a conclusive proof it was not the climate of Chusan which killed the private soldiers of the 26th; they would have died anywhere under similar circumstances.

Population, Character, &c.

The population of the island of Chusan is stated by the Rev. Dr. Gutzlaff to be, at a maximum, 270,000, exclusive of the islands. Lieutenant Sargent, of Her Majesty's 18th Regiment, was out four months with Captain D'Haviland, engaged in surveying the interior of the island, and pointed out to me 100 thickly populated towns and villages, as marked on his map, which are stated by Lieutenant Sargent to contain each from 1,000 to 5,000 inhabitants. He considers the island thickly peopled, and it appeared so to me in my excursions. The density of the population may be inferred from the circumstance of the females being equal, if not exceeding the males in number, and from the great abundance of children everywhere observable.

There is now before me a census of the town or city of Tinghae, the capital of Chusan, made by the Rev. Dr. Gutzlaff in 1843, in which each house is numbered, the occupation of the proprietor stated, and the men and women, boys and girls, enumerated. According to this document, the inhabitants of Tinghae city are,

Men	9,842
Women	7,870
Boys	4,961
Girls	3,477
Total	26,150

The number of houses is given at 4,556, which, divided amongst 26,150 inhabitants, would give nearly six persons to each dwelling, a small average for China.

In robustness of form the men of Chusan, who are of an underset build, are quite equal to those of England; and they travel easily with a weight on their shoulders, slung from either end of a bamboo, which the stoutest London porter would find it difficult to raise from the ground. They are industrious, civil, inquisitive, ready to supply any of our wants, and imitate anything we require to be made.

The population is chiefly agricultural. There is much apparent comfort in the farm-houses; abundance of pigs, poultry, and goats round every farm. The people are comfortably clothed, lodged, and well fed. There is no extreme poverty, no beggars, and few large estates, the proprietorship of land being very much subdivided. There is great honesty among all classes, who are in general peaceable,

peaceable, orderly, and well-conducted. Captain Bamfield, the magistrate of the island (to whom great credit is due for the preservation of social order), informs me that there has not been a case of homicide in the island since the peace in 1842, and that he does not know of any other part of the world where there is so little crime in proportion to the population. Indeed the petty offences that take place are committed by strangers to the island; by persons from the main land.

The police for the whole island does not cost 100 dollars a month, and he amount of property stolen and not recovered, does not amount to 150 dollars a year. There is frequently a clear gaol, and of the 18 or 20 prisoners now there, most of them are confined for selling samshoo (spirit) to the soldiers. In civil cases, regarding money or land, the people cheerfully submit their suits to Captain Bamfield's arbitration, and almost without exception, the defaulters admit the claims made on them, and readily consent to arrangements for liquidating the debt in time, according to their means.

The debts of ancestors are always recognised.

The people seem attached to our rule; they imitate our customs, and have great confidence in our veracity. In many parts of Tinghae, the name and designation of the shopkeeper is neatly painted in English over his door. Our language is being acquired very rapidly; particularly by young people, and they take great delight in their proficiency. Idolatry or superstition seems to have little hold on them; veneration for the names of their ancestors, and the performance of various funeral rights at picturesque or neatly sculptured tombs, constitute their principal religious creed and ritual.

Although, spies have been sent from the main land by the mandarins to watch and intimidate those who might be friendly disposed towards us, yet many have not hesitated to avow their anxiety for our retention of the island, and to express their dread of the restoration of mandarin authority, and all its "squeezings," and indefinable exactions.

A revenue might easily be derived from Chusan, adequate at least to the payment of its civil government. It is stated, that during the Chinese occupation of the island, the land revenue was 13,500 leangs of silver annually. The leang at Ningpo is equal to 2,000 cash. There was also paid, six measures of rice at 23 cash per measure, and 15 catties of grain, at 16 cash per catty, on each mow of cultivated land. The tax was levied in coin, and paid into the imperial Treasury. Among other taxes, there was a stamp on deeds, on the registration of property, &c. There was also a tax on the "foundation of houses," which may be considered a ground-rent. There could be little difficulty in raising a sufficient revenue from such an extensive population, spread over a highly cultivated country.

Animal Food, Fish and Vegetable Productions.

Of beef, mutton, and pork there is a regular supply at an average price of 4 *d.* per pound. The grazing ground is good, and under European management, cattle might be reared and fattened in great numbers; the milk and butter of the cow, and of the buffalo is very rich, and sells at moderate price. The flavour of the Chusan mutton is excellent. Goats are numerous; hams are well cured, and nearly equal in flavour to those of England. Deer and hares are in season during the winter months. Beef and pork might be cured to any extent in winter, for the supply of the navy, and kept in ice-houses till required; bullocks are about 40 *s.* each. Salt is made in great abundance on the coast of Chusan, and on the neighbouring islands.

Poultry are plentiful, and moderate in price, and of fine flavour. The Chusan fowls are larger than any that are to be seen in England; geese are excellent; ducks are hatched by steam, and reared by thousands; one boy has charge of many hundreds, they feed in the rice fields and canals. Eggs are very abundant, usual price, 150 for a dollar. Of game there are pheasants, snipe, quail, woodcock, teal, duck, wild geese (large and good), wild swan (very plentiful), &c.

Bread and confectionary prepared in the English style, are well made by the Chinese; 16 pound loaves of excellent white bread may be bought for one dollar. Wheat is grown on the hills, and rice and millet in the vallies.

Cauliflowers, peas and beans, cabbages, spinach, cucumbers, onions, turnips, carrots,

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carrots, sweet potatoes, brinjals, gourds of different descriptions, French beans, radishes, celery, &c. are brought to market in season. European potatoes are now being introduced, and every English vegetable and fruit when cultivated, thrive in perfection. The tea plant grows on the hills, and is sent to Ningpo and Chapoo to be manufactured for the beverage of the higher classes. The wild raspberry and strawberry are in abundance; melons and oranges are excellent. The peach, grape, apple, pear, apricot, cherry, and plum, only require careful cultivation for their improvement. (At Shanghae, the peaches are large and excellent.) Walnuts and Spanish chesnuts come to perfection at Chusan. The tallow tree and varnish tree are amongst the most valuable productions of the island. From the tallow tree a great abundance of candles of a waxey consistence are prepared. The varnish tree yields a wood oil of great use in furniture. The bamboo and dwarf oak abound; cotton of excellent quality is largely cultivated. Silk, as yet, is of limited production. The tobacco of Chusan is much prized. The hop (*humulus*) grows on every hill.

The shores around Chusan abound with fish, some of excellent quality, such as the pomphlat, sole, seer, salt-water trout, herring, rock cod, sturgeon, mackerel, and eel; oysters and crayfish are in perfection.

It is stated that 40,000 fishing vessels arrive annually from different parts of the coast of China, and remain three months fishing off Chusan. The "Yellow Mandarin" fishery is analogous to the herring fishery of Great Britain or Holland; about 300,000 dollars capital is invested in this lucrative trade. Ice-boats attend the fishing-boats off Chusan, and as soon as the fish are caught they are packed in ice, and sent to the most distant parts of the empire.

Commercial Advantages of Chusan.

The external commerce of Chusan on our occupation of the island, consisted chiefly of salted and dry fish, of salt, and of samshu, an ardent spirit distilled from rice, millet, and other grains. There was also a considerable entrepôt trade between the northern and southern coasts of China. Now a foreign trade has commenced which will probably increase to a very large extent if we retain the island. In two articles of British manufacture, the sales at Chusan during the past year, amounted to 1,000,000 of dollars; viz.

	Dollars.
Cotton goods to the extent of - - -	750,000
Wollon ditto - ditto - - - - -	250,000
Dollars - - -	1,000,000

In July 1843, Captain Cleverly, of the "William Hughes," sold in four day in Chusan harbour, woollen goods to the amount of 85,000 dollars. There was not so much merchandize sold at the consular ports of Shanghai and Ningpo in nine months as was sold at Chusan in the earlier months of 1843. The Chinese prefer purchasing goods at Chusan, as there is no monopoly, and as they have no China custom-house mark on them; and they are thus more readily saleable at the different ports along the coast, as they can be transmitted into the interior of the country without being subject to the transit duties, which are levied on British manufactures even after they have paid the custom duties at the consular ports.

The possession of Chusan as a trading emporium is the more necessary, by reason of the state of four of the consular ports which, excepting, perhaps, Shanghai, have not in any degree realised the expectations entertained.

There is no British trade at Amoy. The "Erin," and the "Marianne Webb," were at Amoy during the present month (August 1844), and could not sell a bail of cotton goods, or of anything, although there was no stock on hand. At Ningpo there is no resident British merchant; there is one young man, a commission agent, in connexion with his brother at Shanghai. Goods have been lying at Ningpo for the last six months unsaleable. The Ningpo authorities are ever throwing impediments in the way of trade. They forbid the introduction of foreign goods in native vessels from Chusan. I may mention the following fact. In July 1844, the "Cornwall," an English vessel of 300 tons, arrived at Ningpo from Singapore with a cargo of "Straits' produce," and some British manufactures. The "Cornwall" was chartered by a Chinaman, who is a merchant

chant residing at Singapore; he was born at Malacca, and his ancestors for three generations have been British subjects. There was a Chinaman from Singapore placed on board as supercargo by the Malacca-Chinese merchant; but the captain of the ship and his crew were English. On the arrival of the "Cornwall" at Ningpo, the mandarins resolved on confiscating the ship and cargo, and it was only by the urgent representations of the consul that she was saved.

The "Cornwall" then left Ningpo for Shanghai, and was totally lost on one of the banks in the Yang-tze-Keang River, when proceeding thither. The general policy of the Chinese Government is obviously directed to the greatest possible concentration of the foreign trade, thus rendering it subject to a more rigid system of supervision, and more available for exactions. The Tartar government dread the extension of our trade in the northern ports, and would gladly drive it all back to Canton.

Mr. Thom, the Consul at Ningpo, who framed the new Chinese tariff, who was the chief eulogist on the advantageous extension of British trade with China, whose knowledge of the Chinese language is complete, and who has married a China woman, now acknowledges that all his hopes have been disappointed. He said (10th August 1844), "Free trade has proved a failure in China; everything here runs into monopoly; Government have appointed three hongs who alone are permitted to sell tea at Ningpo; government have granted a monopoly of all iron made in the district to one hong, consisting of two or three individuals. An English ship brought some iron here the other day, the Chinaman who bought the English iron at a dollar a pecul below the price at which the monopolist hong was selling the native iron, was cited before the mandarins, who, after urgent remonstrances and reference to the treaty, at length said, the monopoly was granted for internal or home-made iron, and that the Chinaman was at liberty to complete his purchase of the English iron; but in a short time the iron monopolist hong trumped up some other charge against the purchaser of the English iron, false witnesses were easily procured, and the unfortunate purchaser of cheap English iron was committed to prison. No interference of the Consul could be made, as the alleged offence had no reference to trade. The accused would probably be squeezed of all his property, and feel thankful he had escaped with life. Such conduct deters other Chinese traders from purchasing English goods, particularly where a monopoly has been granted."

Mr. Thom proceeded further to observe: "You may lay down large and liberal principles, but they are sure to be defeated in detail by the mandarins. Although the duties are low on imported English goods, yet a man prefers going over in his junk to Chusan, where he fills her with English goods, and takes them to Chapoo, Shantung, &c., where they are readily bought. The same goods, if sold at Ningpo, would be marked at the custom-house, and 50 or 60 miles in the interior, the mandarins levy a heavy internal transit duty, which effectually checks the consumption of British manufactures. I see no prospect of a large increase of trade with China, which has nothing but tea and silk to export, and no money; silver is becoming scarcer every day; 2,000 cash are now required here for a tael of silver; opium has drained the country. Formerly the Chinese bought our watches, mirrors, and other articles of luxury, now they are unable to do so, and there is evidently an increasing national impoverishment and deterioration.* In the Chinese you behold a nation without truth and without morals!"

Ningpo, one of the largest and wealthiest cities in China, may be viewed as a complete failure for a British consular port. Shanghai has had more trade than Ningpo, because vessels that went to Chusan last year and discharged their cargoes there, were tempted this year to go to Shanghai, in the hope of obtaining higher prices and a better return cargo. In both these respects they have been disappointed. Prices were as good, if not better, at Chusan than at Shanghai, and nothing but a few bales of silk could be had at Shanghai for a return cargo. The whole British tonnage entering the port of Shanghai for the quarter ending June 1844 (the most favourable period for reaching Shanghai from the eastward) was five vessels, with an aggregate of 1,140 tons. On 18th August 1844, there was not a British or European vessel at Shanghai. Captain Balfour, the active, intelligent, and firm Consul of Shanghai, is exerting himself most strenuously to overcome

* This is also the opinion of the Rev. Mr. Medhurst, at Shanghai.

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overcome the difficulties thrown in the way of foreign trade; the utmost he has been able to procure for British ships this year has been some raw silk,. Although the new teas have long since appeared at Canton, up to the 17th August 1844 none were brought to Shanghai. Several of the British merchants at Canton have partners or agents at Shanghai, with capital ready to purchase teas or silk, but they cannot obtain them.

With regard to Foochoofoo, although the consul has been there two months, not a vessel has even called to inquire if there be a market; so hopeless is it deemed to contend with the opposition in the consular ports.

It is for these among other reasons that Chusan would be so valuable as a British commercial entrepôt. Already goods have been frequently purchased there for the coast of Shantung, but probably destined for the Gulf of Petchely and other places to the northward of the Yang-tze-Keang River. Chusan would also most probably become an entrepôt for the valuable trade of Formosa, from which island it is only distant 300 miles, and from whence there is an immense importation of sugar into Ningpo and Shanghai for the supply of the rich northern and central provinces of China, where the consumption is very great. The sugar would be a valuable article for shipment to England, and would be much more advantageously transhipped at a free port like Chusan, than under the trammels of the custom-house arrangements at Ningpo or Shanghai, irrespective of the export duty levied at these ports, which on low sugar becomes a heavy per centage. The Formosa junks take back raw cotton, cotton cloths, Straits' produce, &c. all of which British merchants could supply from Chusan. The proximity of Chapoo, the seat of the China Japanese trade to Chusan, is of considerable importance, as the merchants engaged in it would doubtless prefer making their purchases of foreign goods at Chusan, free from duty, to proceeding out of their way to Shanghai, to buy them at an enhanced cost. The Japanese, three centuries ago, made Chusan their entrepôt.

Japan is within two or three days' sail of Chusan, and accessible at all seasons of the year. Our occupation of Chusan would sooner or later bring about an intercourse with that exclusive people the Japanese, on the grounds that we had formerly a factory at Firando, in Japan; that we were unjustly expelled, and that we have an equal right with the Dutch to trade on free and just terms with the Japanese.

There are several other places with which a trade might be opened with Chusan, viz. with Corea, which contains about 12,000,000 inhabitants, the Loochoo Islands, the coast of Manchouria, the Kurile Islands, and even with Kamstchatka, &c. In fact, a new and large commercial world would be opened for England.

The whale-fishing is now being extended into the Northern Pacific, Chinese and Japanese Seas. Driven successively from the northern and southern polar regions, this gigantic and useful animal is seeking refuge in seas hitherto little frequented, from his untiring pursuers. To the whale ships, Chusan would be an invaluable port for recruitment.

In viewing Chusan as a commercial emporium, it is important to bear in mind, that although the largest class of ships in the British Navy may with as perfect safety reach Chusan as any other part of the world, yet the navigation to the northward of Chusan is difficult even for small class vessels of 200 tons burthen; very few of which reach Shanghae without getting on shore on a mud bank. It would be hazardous for large class ships to enter the Woosung River, on which Shanghai is situated.

The same remark applies to the gulf of Petchele, the Hwang or Yellow River, the Pecho, and the other ports and rivers to the northward of the Yang-tze-Keang. This circumstance would have given us a great advantage, by enabling merchants to send goods direct from England in large ships to Chusan, where they would be transhipped direct to the English coasting craft or Chinese junks without further expense. At present goods are sent to Hong Kong or Canton, there warehoused, considerable expense incurred, and then re-embarked in small class schooners or brigs for the northward, thus materially enhancing the cost of the goods, and delaying their transmission to the place of sale, namely, the richest and most populous districts of China, which lie contiguous to Chusan, and render its position in a mercantile view so important.

Ere long the valuelessness of our consular stations, except Canton, will be fully perceived; it will then be acknowledged that the present stations were hastily and

John Arrowsmith, Lithe.

CHUSAN HARBOUR,

drawn

by O. Cleverly.

Rise of Tide 12 feet 6 inches

EXPLANATION.

signifies a Road.

d.° Canal.

Ebb setts.

Flood d.°

Scale 2 inches = 1 Mile.

¼ ½ ¾ 1 Mile.

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and injudiciously selected; that other places, such as Suchoo, at the head of the Woosung River, Chinkeangfoo, near the Grand Canal, below Nankin, and Teensin, the port of the Peiho, were much better adapted for our trade. The annual expense of our consular establishments on the China coast of 30,000*l.* to 40,000*l.* a year, without any corresponding advantage, will be severely felt, should the Chinese Government resolve to open no other ports. The intrinsic worth of Chusan as a British port will then be more manifest; our possession of the island will force the Tartar Government of China to the adoption of a less exclusive system; for the natural and apparently instinctive love of a Chinaman for trade would make him the conveyor of our merchandize to the numerous ports and wealthy districts around our settlement, thus bringing about practically a free trade with China which, ultimately, its Government would be forced to recognize, protect, and encourage.

Maritime Position.

The navigation of the China Seas up to Chusan is perfectly safe and easy in all seasons. The difficulty in reaching the northern ports against the monsoon has been purposely magnified by those engaged in the opium trade, who have for several years past navigated the whole coast of China regardless of the monsoon. Captains of merchant vessels declare they would rather proceed from Hong Kong to Chusan in the north-east monsoon than they would pass through the English Channel in winter.

A vessel proceeding from Singapore or any southern port up the China Sea against the monsoon, can reach Chusan as easily as Hong Kong. and within three or four days of the time, the difference of distance being only 700 miles. The China coast as far north as Chusan, and the entrance of the Yang-tsze-Keang River is bold, steep, and skirted with islands, where good anchorage may always be found.

The harbour of Chusan is superior to that of Hong Kong, more easy of access and exit in all winds, and safer in a typhoon. No gale can raise a sea in Chusan harbour. The holding-ground is a tenacious clay, and when the junks are driven ashore, owing to their imperfect moorings, they drive on a mud bank from whence they immediately get off in fine weather. Sixty sail of British vessels have anchored in Chusan harbour at once, and the adjacent safe and large harbour termed "Spithead," would contain treble that number of vessels. Excellent anchorage exists throughout the whole Chusan archipelago, and which is accessible to vessels proceeding in any direction to or from Chusan.

It is worthy of note, that throughout the whole year Chusan is to windward of the Yang-tsze-Keang River, and the adjacent ports and main land of China, so that ships of war or transports can at any period with certainty enter the Yang-tsze-Keang in two days after leaving Chusan harbour. Naval commanders will immediately perceive the great importance of such an advantage.

Military Position.

A glance at the map of China will instantly demonstrate the many advantages which Chusan possesses as a military station. Midway between the northern and southern extremities of this immense empire, at the entrance of the vast Yang-tsze-Keang, which divides China into two parts, and by means of the extraordinary canals all centering in this river, affords a cheap and ready water communication with Pekin and all the richest cities and most fertile plains, sufficiently distant from the main land to prevent observation, and to guard against a surprise, in a healthy climate, abounding in commissariat supplies, and with the most important maritime advantages, Chusan may justly be termed the key of China.

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Concluding Observations against the Evacuation of Chusan by England.

A careful reflection on the policy of the Tartar Government at Pekin, and a minute examination of the occurrences in China during the last few years, will lead to the conclusion that although the people, especially those of the northern and central provinces, are not adverse to us, but, on the contrary, are eager to trade with us according to the extent of their means, yet that their Tartar rulers view us with alarm and fear, are anxiously desirous of keeping us at the very

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extreme part of the empire, and would gladly adopt any means, either of fraud or force, which might secure our entire expulsion from China.* This is quite natural, when we consider that a mere handful of semi-barbarous but brave and crafty men hold sway over 300 millions of people, whose national and ancient dynasty they, as conquerors, have displaced, and who must feel that, notwithstanding two centuries of occupation and imperial despotism, they are still an isolated race, among myriads who submit by compulsion to their sway, as they would to that of any other foreign power, but who, nevertheless, anxiously hope for the restoration of a sovereign of Chinese origin, identified with the inhabitants by all those strong but indescribable ties which characterise persons of the same blood, lineage, and nation.

The late war with England, limited as it was in extent and duration, shook the Tartar Government to its foundation, and its protraction of hostilities for a brief period, and the occupation of Nankin, must, perhaps, have ended in its overthrow, or the abandonment of Pekin for a retreat in Mantchouria.

The appearance of a fleet of 60 sail of British vessels off Nankin (for which Admiral Sir William Parker deserves the highest credit) inspired such alarm at Pekin that Her Majesty's plenipotentiary had nothing to do but dictate the terms on which peace would be granted. Those terms were hastily settled; several important points were overlooked, and so-called concessions were obtained, which were not only valueless (as, for example, permission to trade to ports, and incur heavy expense where there is no commerce), but as, in the grant of Hong Kong to the British Crown, was positively injurious, and a waste of life and treasure, without the slightest compensating advantage. No right of direct correspondence with the Imperial Cabinet or with the Lefanyuen Board, or Foreign Office of Pekin, through which the Russians and other nations, not in subjection to China, correspond, was even procured.

The obtainment by the treaty of Nankin of the payment of 21,000,000 of dollars, has been viewed as a great gain to England; but when the accounts of the East India Company, and of the War Office, Navy, and Victualling Department are rendered; when the deduction of 6,000,000 dollars for the pretended surrender of a quantity of opium is made, and various other deductions for hong merchants' debts and alleged losses are added, it will be seen that no surplus of the 21,000,000 dollars will ever enter the British Exchequer. Even if there were a surplus, our present annual expenditure of half a million sterling on this coast for Hong Kong, &c., would soon absorb it; while almost every dollar now spent by us here returns to China, and will soon reimburse the Chinese for the indemnity of 21,000,000 dollars.

In both our treaty and supplemental treaty, we have bound and fettered ourselves in a manner never before seen in the regulations between two independent nations; instead of obtaining unrestricted freedom of trade and intercourse whereby we might become better known and assimilated with the Chinese, and thus laid the foundation of a lasting peace on the basis of mutual interest, we have voluntarily fettered ourselves, almost shut the door which we had been so long anxious to open; made ourselves the police and custom-house officers and even spies of the Emperor of China (*see* Supplementary Treaty and Consular Regulations), and adopted a tone of policy which must ultimately end in a serious infraction of the treaty, attended, probably, by disastrous results, and the inevitable sequel, another war, in which the Tartars (who are now purchasing largely of arms and ammunition) may be better prepared than we found them in 1841–42.

In conformity with what appears to me an erroneous Anglo-Chinese policy, British ships and British subjects are prohibited going beyond the 32d degree of north latitude. This is exactly the part of the coast of China, and that portion of the Chinese people, with which we ought to become better acquainted, and where there is a probability of the woollen cloths being sold which are now lying

* On the 12th of October 1842, very shortly after the signing of the Treaty of Nankin, an imperial decree was issued from Pekin respecting "the extermination of the native traitors," *i. e.*, of all who had in any manner assisted or countenanced the English during the war. The places for their destruction or police supervision are laid down in this document, and they are a clear violation of the Treaty of Nankin. The document fully evinces, also, the readiness of the Chinese Government to break any agreement which it might suit their policy to adopt. The functions of the most petty mandarin, and the duties of the Imperial Cabinet at Pekin, are equally interwoven with intrigue, which constitutes the every-day business and pleasure of official life in China.

lying at Shanghai and Ningpo, or are being returned to Canton unsaleable. Why should English merchants be prohibited by their own Government from coasting the Shantung promontory, the mouth of the Peiho, the Corean peninsula, the Kurile islands, &c.? * Our free intercourse with these regions would benefit the Chinese and Coreans as well as ourselves. It might be thought irrelevant were I to descant further on the Anglo-Chinese policy; in the remarks which I have made I have been desirous of demonstrating that in my humble opinion the course hitherto adopted is not that which will secure a permanent peace and a beneficial and friendly interchange of commercial resources and of intellectual advantages.

To avoid or at least mitigate the evil consequences attending a ruption between England and China, our continued occupation of Chusan seems to me the most advisable course. There are many fair and forcible reasons which would justify this occupation, and which would enable us to prove to the Chinese Government that it would be for their immediate and permanent interest and national safety that we should remain in possession of Chusan. It is a trite remark on England that what she gains by war she loses by diplomacy; if we abandon Chusan, the truth of the remark will be forcibly illustrated.

* * * * * *

A brief remark on another point appears necessary. It has been supposed by some that the Chinese empire is on the eve of dissolution, and that any foreign aggression or pressure from without, would cause rebellion and anarchy throughout the whole country.

That China is a decaying nation is evident to those who attentively examine its condition. We see no new intellect; no improvement in anything, in the military art or in nautical affairs. The skill of past ages is now unexercised, and the people point with pride to monumental or triumphal arches (as at Ningpo), bronze castings, sculptures and carving, which they are at present unable to execute. Although abounding in authors and literature, no work has been written on the Anglo-Chinese war; nothing in fact was composed or appeared from the numerous printing offices of China but the lives of two or three generals who had committed suicide or were killed in action. Wealth, individual and national, is diminishing, and the influence of Government (at least of the Executive Government) decaying. In these opinions the Rev. Mr. Medhurst, Mr. Thom, and other Chinese scholars, agree. But although the mass of the Chinese people are either stagnant or retrograding, there does not appear any ground for supposing that the complete and final overthrow of the Tartar Government would cause general disorder, plunder, and anarchy in China. It is impossible to examine the economy and police of a Chinese city and not perceive how carefully life and property are preserved by their "watch and ward" system, and to admit that if left to themselves, and not obliged to flee in terror to save their lives from a foreign "Barbarian," how fully adequate the Chinese themselves are to the maintenance of the municipalities that exist in each city in China. The idea, therefore, that the Chinese empire is likely to fall, and to be destroyed, if England persevered in seeking a freer intercourse with the people, I think untenable; that the Tartar authority might in time be shaken or put aside, is not altogether improbable, but that would not affect the mass of the nation, except perhaps beneficially, by giving them an impetus and vivification which they have long required. But the assertion, if substantially correct, would be no justification for our resigning Chusan; our occupation of that island could not accelerate the dissolution of the Chinese empire, on the contrary, it might be made the means of retarding such an event; and even should it occur, our position near the Yang-tze-Keang would enable us to retain any commerce we had established, and to carry on the tea trade should it be driven from Canton.

In conclusion, there are, I respectfully submit, many cogent arguments of the highest state policy for our continued and permanent occupation of Chusan, and but one reason assigned for its evacuation in December 1845, namely, that we have promised to do so on the fulfilment of the terms of the treaty of Nankin. But have these terms been fulfilled in the letter and spirit in which they were framed

* The Americans are now proceeding to the northward of 32°, and we have thus thrown the trade into the hands of our rivals on this coast.—*R. M. M.*

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framed by the British? Has diplomacy lost all power that it cannot be exercised in the intervening period assigned for the evacuation? I am ready, if required, to lay before Her Majesty's Ministers my reasons for entertaining a strong opinion, that without any violation of the treaty of Nankin, and without fraud or force, Chusan may be retained, and become, as it assuredly would, one of the most valuable and important colonies of the British Crown.

(signed) *R. M. Martin.*

Friday, 30 August 1844.

REGISTER of Lieutenant *G. H. Shead*'s Thermometer at *Chusan*, for the Three Hot Months June, July, and August 1844.

——	9.	12.	3.	——	9.	12.	3.	——	9.	12.	3.
June	°	°	°	July	°	°	°	August	°	°	°
1	70	73	71	1	74½	76	76⅓	1	81	83	83
2	64	66	65	2	74	75	75	2	81	82	81
3	70	73	71	3	74	76	76	3	81	84	85
4	72	74	73	4	76	77	77½	4	81½	81	84
5	72	74	74	5	78	82	81	5	81	85	85
6	73	74	74	6	78	82	82	6	80	83	83
7	72	73	71	7	80	81	81	7	82	84	84
8	73	74	74	8	79½	84	85	8	81	85	85
9	72	74	71	9	79	83½	84	9	82	86	86
10	70	72	71	10	80	84	84	10	82	85	86
11	68	69	69	11	80	83	84	11	81	85	85
12	67	69	69⅓	12	80	85	84½	12	82	82	83
13	65	68	69	13	82	84	85	13	82	84	84
14	70	73	75	14	80	84	83	14	82	87	86
15	71	73	74	15	80	84	83½	15	81	85	86
16	74	76	76	16	80	83	85½	16	81	83½	85
17	74	76	76	17	83	92	92	17	82	84	84
18	74	76	77	18	79	83½	84	18	79½	81½	82
19	77	80	77	19	80	82	82	19	78	79½	82
20	70	73½	72½	20	79	80	81½	20	82	85	85
21	69	70	70	21	79	81½	82	21	81	84	84
22	70	73	73	22	80	83½	83	22	79	83	84
23	70	70½	71	23	81	83	83	23	80	84	84
24	68	71	72	24	78	81	81	24	78	83	83½
25	70	72	74	25	79	81½	81	25	79	83	84
26	71	71	71	26	80	82	82½	26	79	84	85
27	72	72	72	27	80	84	84	27	80	85	86
28	73	74	74	28	81	84	78	28	81	86	86
29	73	77	77	29	78	82	82	29	80	84	85
30	75	76	75	30	81	83	83	30	79	83	84
				31	81	83	81	31	78	81	82

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No. 5. Minute on the British Position and Prospects in China.

MINUTE on the British Position and Prospects in *China*.

It is of great importance to examine our present novel and somewhat anomalous position in China; to ascertain what are our prospects in various points of view; and to trace the line of policy which national interests, in combination with national responsibility, would indicate as the most advisable course to be pursued with reference to the mutual benefit of Great Britain, and of the vast Chinese empire.

For two centuries England carried on a restricted commercial intercourse with one port of China, through the medium of a well-organised mercantile company. China was politically isolated from all other nations, and our sole object was to maintain in peace a profitable trade, subject to the control, and not infrequent interruption of a haughty, jealous, and exclusive government.

Our open, extensive, and increasing prosecution of a traffic in a prohibited and pernicious drug, was necessarily followed by violent acts on the part of a proud and

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and determined viceroy, whose power was unequal to his will, and who resorted to the only means at his command for the forcible suppression of what was deemed by his sovereign a grievous evil, fraught with great injury and suffering to the people, and to the country at large.

The result was soon manifested. England, much against her inclination, was compelled to declare war against the government of China. The Chinese, whether by sea or by land, were everywhere easily discomfited; the momentary fight was soon converted into an indiscriminate slaughter; fire and suicide completed the dreadful havoc; the conquered cities became in several instances scenes of plunder, desolation, and anarchy, commerce was interrupted, and inland communication cut off. Finally, the Chinese government was compelled to sue for peace, to pay the whole of the then estimated expenses of the war, to permit resort to four other ports as well as to Canton, to reduce their custom duties and port charges, and to cede an island to Great Britain on which a colonial establishment could be maintained for the protection of British commerce, for the development of civilization on the frontiers of the Chinese empire, and which would not only serve as a guarantee for the future, but which would aid in preserving peace between the two countries. English interests are now, therefore, irrevocably interwoven with those of China. We hold the largest stake at issue as regards her peaceful prosperity and national independence; and whatever strengthens our power, extends our commerce, and permanently enlarges our influence, is equally beneficial to China and to England.

Other nations have since come forward to claim a participation in the concessions obtained by England. Treaties have been entered into with the United States and with France, and China for the first time has entered into the social compact which kingdoms, as well as individuals, find necessary for their protection, and which, rightly understood, is indispensable to their tranquillity and to their improvement.

The far-seeing politician must therefore admit, that sooner or later China (whose inhabitants, it is estimated number one-third of the human race) will exercise an important influence on the affairs of Europe. How this influence will be primarily manifested, whether through India or through Russia, or by reason of European nations contending for a dominant power in this vast empire, it seems impossible to predicate; but this much is evident, that no nation is so deeply interested in the "Chinese question" as England; that this interest must daily increase on political, maritime, and mercantile consideration, and that a solemn responsibility has devolved on England in relation to China, which cannot be neglected without involving serious, and perhaps irretrievable calamities.

* * * * * *

To the British colonial possessions, and to new and unexplored regions must England look for the increase of her commerce. The East and the West Indies, the Canadas, Australasia, and Africa, afford valuable and permanent markets within our control; but, excepting India, their expansion must be of slow growth, and inadequate to meet increasing exigencies; the opening, therefore, of the new, vast, and populous territories on the borders of the Northern Pacific, is a matter of vital consequence to England.

Have we availed ourselves of the advantages which this opening affords?

Have we not by a mistaken policy, and by a non-appreciation of the true interests of England, almost shut the door against ourselves which we had been so long anxious to open; and virtually, voluntarily excluded the British nation from a country where it is palpably our interest to have a decided paramount influence, and where by our science, intercourse, and commerce, we may exert a beneficial effect on many millions of mankind? The solution of these questions is deserving of early and serious investigation. At the close of a desolating and expensive war, in August 1842, in a position to dictate our own terms, and when all negotiation was unnecessary, and set aside by the Chinese authorities themselves,* the British plenipotentiary adopted the printed draft of a treaty framed in

* It is perfectly well known, that when Lieutenant colonel Malcolm was sent on shore at Nankin, with the terms on which peace would be granted, the Imperial Commissioner was surprised that so little was asked, and inquired, "Is that all?" which, being answered affirmatively, he immediately replied, "All shall be granted."

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in Downing-street, and sent out to Captain Elliot for his guidance at Canton. This treaty was prepared at a time when we were ignorant on various points connected with China, and great allowance must be made for its framers. Without, therefore, that diplomatic tact or foresight which an acquaintance with European policy, and British domestic as well as foreign interests would have conveyed, and without reference to the new position in which we were at Nankin, and to the greater knowledge we had obtained of the people and country in the north of China, we imposed only the terms sketched in the draft treaty, and filled up the blank after the word "islands" in the draft with "Hong Kong," and excluded Chusan, the only valuable island on the coast of China adapted for the great purposes which England ought to have had in view. A primary condition of the treaty was the payment by the Chinese Government of a sum of money then deemed adequate to the expenses of the war; it is now, however, confidently stated by Commissariat officers, that the money thus obtained will not cover the mere pecuniary expenditure incurred by Great Britain, after paying for the alleged destruction of opium, for the hong debts, the prize money to the army and navy, irrespective of the loss of troops by sickness, each of whom costs the State 100 *l.*

But it having been agreed that the so-called indemnity-money should be paid by the Chinese Government in half-yearly instalments, spreading over a period of three years and a half, the maintenance of a military and naval force on the coasts of China, at a charge, in money alone, of about half a million sterling annually, was deemed necessary. It can scarcely, therefore, be contended that the "indemnity-money" was, to the extent alleged, of such great advantage, and that the British Exchequer has not suffered considerable diminution by the war with China.

The next great advantage which it was supposed we had gained was the establishment of four new ports for British trade, as named in the printed draft treaty sent from Downing-street.

Here we committed a great error. Our obvious and natural policy was to cause every port in China to be open to us, and to have obtained perfect freedom of ingress and egress to or from any city, town, or place in China, with secure guarantees for life, property, and the peaceable and unrestricted prosecution of commerce. This would have enabled our traders to seek out the best spots for mercantile settlement, and time and circumstances would thus have indicated and proved the most suitable marts for extended traffic.

If it had even been resolved to restrict the maritime trade to a few ports, in order that the Chinese customs revenue might be more readily collected, then it was our duty to have selected very different ports from those which (through want of information) were selected in Downing-street, and which, at any rate, ought to have been preceded by a commission of inquiry as to their eligibility for European traffic.

Nankin, the great central mart of the Chinese empire, Yang-choo-foo, on the north bank, and Chin-kang-foo, on the south bank of the vast Yang-tze-Kang, were neglected, together with the numerous cities and towns bordering on this vast artery, which, it is said, extends through the richest regions of China for 1,800 miles; so, also, Chapoo, the port of Hangchoo, as large as Canton, and the seat of trade with Japan; Kanchoo-foo on the northern, and Tingchoo-foo on the southern part of the Shantung Promontory; Tientzin in the Peiho River, and the port of Pekin; Kichu and Kinchu, on the northern part of the Gulf of Pechelee in 40° to 41° N. lat., rich in agricultural productions, and good stations for trade with Tartary.

These and other important places were lost sight of in our hasty, restricted, and ill-arranged proceedings. We allowed our attention to be diverted from the rich and populous regions at the northern and central part of the empire, to the comparatively barren and valueless coast at its southern extremity.

Even at the ports chosen for our maritime trade we took no precautions to secure freedom of access and right of trade and residence at and in the cities to which these ports were attached, and which it is understood the present plenipotentiary of Her Majesty is now strenuously and laudably endeavouring to accomplish.

This is manifest as regards Canton, where we are still confined to a few feet of occupation on the left bank of the river, outside the suburbs of the city, daily insulted, and with life and property exposed to constant risk.

We

We are prohibited sending a boat, for pleasure or for traffic, to Futchau, a thriving manufacturing town about 20 miles above Canton, or to Shaou-choofoo, or Chau-kingfoo on the Canton River, cities nearly as large and as wealthy as Canton, although goods must pass Whampoa, which is equally the anchorage of those cities as well as of Canton.*

The same may be said of the city of Chang-choo-foo, a few miles above Amoy, of which city Amoy is but the outlet. So also of Suchoo, of which Shanghai is only the port. It would be as absurd of the French or of any other nation to say they were admitted to freedom of trade with England if we permitted them an anchorage at Gravesend, and a few feet of ground for a residence on the bank of the Thames at Rotherhithe or Wapping, for London; at Pill, for Bristol; at Birkenhead, for Liverpool; at Cove, for Cork; or at Greenock, for Glasgow.

Of the four selected ports, three (Amoy, Foochoo, and Ningpo) have scarcely any foreign trade, and do not appear likely ever to have any of great importance, unless we had perfect freedom of internal intercourse, and could also trade between the above-named ports and Formosa, an island rich in tropical productions, and with which an extensive traffic is carried on in sugar, oil, camphor, timber, &c.

The province of Fokien, like that of Canton, is very barren and comparatively poor. Our object should have been the formation of establishments at the far richer cities bordering on the Yang-tze-Kang and other rivers to the northward.

So long as we are confined to the coast and to the southern part of the empire, and denied access to the great rivers and cities in the interior, our trade will be stunted or subject to considerable fluctuations; but when enabled to traverse the great veins and arteries of this vast empire, to navigate with steam to the central and civilized cities which cover the land, we may look forward to an augmenting and steady trade, and to an intimate friendly intercourse, fraught with mutual advantage to China and to England.

3d. In obtaining a reduction of the duties on commerce, and a diminution of unequal port-charges, we omitted to obtain an exemption from goods paying duties a second time when found unsaleable at one port and transhipped to another; and also that vessels not "breaking bulk," *i. e.* not discharging any part of their cargo, should, after a reasonable time, be exempt from port dues. These rights have since been gained by the Americans, and we shall derive similar advantages; but we should have obtained the establishment of bonded warehouses at each port; and as the port dues are still heavy, we should have required that a lighthouse be placed at the entrance of each port for their safe navigation. As regards lights, buoys, and moorings, no expense whatever has been incurred by the Chinese Government. The tonnage duties on a ship anchoring at Whampoa, about 12 miles from Canton, is about 3*s.* a ton; at the port of Liverpool the anchorage duty is only 9*d.* There is a heavy outlay incurred by ships being kept at Whampoa instead of proceeding direct to Canton (which is equally as accessible as the port of Calcutta in the Hooghly), in the cost of loading and unloading, in the tedious transfer of goods to and from Canton, and in the charges for provisions at Whampoa being enhanced by the "comprador system," from which several mandarins derive a considerable revenue. Further, the levy of one mace (about 5*d.*) per ton on legally licensed British coasting vessels, every time they enter the port of Canton, is a heavy tax on craft which pass from Hong Kong to Canton three or four times in the month. Until the Supplementary Treaty of 8th October 1843, the number of schooners, sloops, lorchas, &c. plying between Canton and places in the vicinity, was upwards of 70. By Article XVII. of the Supplementary Treaty, all these vessels, up to 150 tons burthen, are subjected to a port duty at Canton of one mace per ton, "every time they enter port." None of these vessels are allowed to be rated (however small) at less than 75 tons. Thus the mere tonnage duty on the smallest cargo boat would, at 5*d.* per ton, and entering the port four times in the month, be equivalent to a tax of 75*l.* a year!

It

* Even a bazaar for the supply of provisions to the large fleet of English ships usually lying at Whampoa, has been prohibited by the authorities.

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It is not surprising that there are but a few lorchas plying between Hong Kong and Canton.

Moreover, these small vessels are obliged, "on passing the Bogue Forts, in the Canton River, to bring to and report, like a large inward-bound vessel;" to "report herself also at the custom-house at Whampoa; on arriving at Canton, her sailing letter (register) to be deposited with the British consul, who will obtain permission from the superintendent of customs to discharge and load." Whether with full or half lading, even to a hundred-weight of cargo, "the smallest boat must pay at the rate of 5*d.* per ton on 75 tons."

This enactment, and clauses 13 and 14 of the Supplemental Treaty, restricting all communication between Hong Kong and the coast of China to the five ports, requiring that "whenever Chinese wish to take goods to Hong Kong for sale, they must first pay the duties according to the new regulations at the custom-houses of the five ports, and obtain permits from the respective custom-houses;" that the "Chinese must ask a passport for coming and going, and the duties are to be paid on the day the goods are imported;" that "the Chinese having purchased goods, must ship them and bring them home in Chinese vessels, which must request passports at Hong Kong, and exhibit the same to the Chinese officers on each arrival and departure, to be examined and countersigned;" that "the custom-houses at the five ports shall monthly make out a report of passes granted, with the names of the vessels and merchants, and the description and amount of goods, to be sent to the commissioner of customs at Canton, and to be examined and verified by the superintending officer at Hong Kong, who shall immediately and faithfully report to the commissioner of customs at Canton, in a prescribed form, month by month, the names of the merchant vessels which arrive and depart, with the names of the merchants and amount of cargo." This enactment and these clauses have, it is now fully acknowledged, struck a severe blow at the coasting trade, the duty and restrictions on the lorchas and small craft rendering them too expensive, and the regulations on the Chinese vessels effectually prohibiting them from ever daring to ask for passes to trade with Hong Kong. The Supplemental Treaty appears to have been most craftily designed for destroying any prospective benefit that Hong Kong might possibly have derived from the usual energy and enterprize of the British merchants. Indeed, it is asserted by Mr. Gutzlaff, that while the treaty was negociating, a proposition was seriously entertained of stationing a Chinese mandarin in Hong Kong, for the collection of duties to be levied here on behalf of the Chinese Government.

An examination of the Chinese tariff will show that the export duties levied by the Chinese Government are very heavy. On tea the export duty ranges from 10 to 20 per cent., on camphor from 12 to 15 per cent., on cassia 12 per cent., and so on, in various proportions throughout the tariff.

It is also confidently stated, that the inland transit duties on British manufactures are still maintained at a high rate, and that our goods are thus effectually excluded from extended consumption in the interior of the country. The effect of the transit duties in impeding the traffic in, and sale of goods, has been manifested in British and foreign India, where they are now almost entirely abolished.

The establishment of a perfectly free port near the Yan-tze-Kang, as at Chusan for instance, would tend to counteract these restrictions; the Chinese junks, when out of sight of their own ports and unwatched, would freely purchase goods,* which the native traders would through various channels, convey into the interior without the Chinese custom-house stamp, which renders goods prohibitory, or which is an incitement to extortions at the different transit stations.

Irrespective of the value which I have endeavoured to demonstrate in my report on Chusan, of the military and naval advantages, and of the geographical position of that island, its intrinsic worth as a station for extended commerce is unquestionable, and the large number of peaceful inhabitants engaged in husbandry

* Since the above was penned, the "Hong Kong Register," a journal belonging to Messrs. Jardine, Matheson & Co., contains, in an editorial article of 15th April 1845, the following remarks:—"A great many new houses and shops are building at Chusan, and a much larger number of boats and junks now frequent the harbour." . . . . . "Had we permanent possession of Chusan, it would be difficult to define the limit to which our influence in China, and our trade to Shantung, the north of China, Corea, and perhaps even to Japan, might extend, either in British or in native bottoms."

husbandry on Chusan, and on the neighbouring islands, is in itself an advantage for the promotion of our trade.

On the fourth point, viz., the cession of a barren, unhealthy, and useless rock at the southern extremity of the empire, it is almost unnecessary to offer a comment, as few disinterested persons now deny that a great error was committed by our acceptance of Hong Kong. Time and events have confirmed the accuracy of my report on the island. It is still devoid of trade, and without prospect of any native or European traffic; its insalubrity is beyond a doubt,* its inapplicability for colonization, unfortunate geographical position even as regards the Canton river estuary, and its inappropriateness as a military station for the maintenance of British supremacy, and tranquillity in China are now pretty generally acknowledged; and many who have spent large sums under the delusion that Hong Kong would become a commercial emporium, would be glad to get back a moiety of their outlay. The "Supplementary Treaty (which throughout was framed restrictively, and adversely to British interests), destroyed the only chance, however remote, that Hong Kong had of even becoming a resort for junks from the coast. The treaty was, however almost supererogatory, for natural and insuperable difficulties prevent the island ever being made worthy the name of a British colony.

On a summary review of the past, it would appear that we have not derived the fair and legitimate advantages that England had a right to obtain from the recent war, and that we have, as usual, lost by diplomacy, the position which had been gained by the sword.

1st. In money, we have not been reimbursed for the expenditure incurred during the war, and we are still incurring a very heavy and unprofitable outlay on this coast.

2d. The expected advantages from opening four commercial ports in addition to the port at Canton, have not been realised; we are still restricted in our intercourse locally and generally, and life and property is considered by no means secure at Canton itself, within 100 yards of the British factory, while ingress and egress is still denied to the city of Canton, where the people are encouraged to treat us with marked contumely and insult, accompanied in some instances by robbery and plunder within sight of the city walls.

3d. The reduction of the duties on commerce, and of the port charges on small coasting craft, and the regulations respecting junks trading with Hong Kong, require further modification; and a satisfactory arrangement with reference to internal transit duties (which is particularly essential if Chusan be not made a free port, or be not permanently retained as one of our colonies).

4th. The cession of Hong Kong to the British Crown was no gain in any one point of view for England; on the contrary, its occupation has caused great destruction of valuable life, and a considerable waste of treasure, while the retention of the island, even with the most rigid economy, must involve an annual sacrifice unattended with any beneficial result.

We made no arrangement for the revision of the treaty at the end of seven or ten years, when the working of its provisions would have been tested by time and experience; and we made no stipulations for the protection of those professing and exercising the Christian faith. Both these points were conceded to the Americans and French as soon as asked, and we are indebted to foreigners for concessions that ought to have been obtained by ourselves.

Having briefly reviewed the past, it may now be inquired what is our present position and policy.

Do we feel secure of continued peace with China? Do we possess any commanding political position, whose retention by a moderate naval and military force may avert the direful calamity of another war? Have we any check to exercise over the Chinese Government which may compel them to keep peace? Are

* During the year 1843, the deaths among the troops in Hong Kong were 1 in 3½; and at Chusan only 1 in 29½. By official returns, printed in the "Friend of China" of 16th April 1845, it appears that the mortality of 1844 has been dreadful. On an average strength of 1,800, the deaths were 373, and the invaliding 333=706, equal to one-third of the garrison. The survivors were unequal to one heavy day's march. Among the deaths were seven European officers; 12 officers invalided. Of 60 officers who lived at Chusan for 18 months, not one died or invalided; and the troops are in as perfect health as if they were in England.

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Are we developing by precept or example any moral control or influence which may surely though slowly win the respect and attachment of the Chinese government and people?

These important questions cannot, it is to be feared, be answered in the negative. The frequent expression of men of all classes in society is: "Another war with China is inevitable. Affairs are not yet settled." On the evacuation of Chusan we shall have no position in China capable of dictating peace, and by the final abandonment of that island next January, we shall have adopted the most effectual step that could be taken for the encouragement of a bloody and perhaps disastrous conflict, of which it is impossible to foresee the termination, and which it is very probable may engender deep and bitter feelings of national hostility to us, unquenchable by time or circumstances.

As a government we are doing nothing for the inculcation of our language, or for rearing a corps of useful and honest interpreters—European or Chinese; we are not merely negative, but prohibitory as regards the dissemination of true religion, although there is no point on which the Chinese government and people are more indifferent; and on other points we are equally unmindful of our permanent interests.

Painful, however, as it is to contemplate the mistakes of the past policy, and the defects of our present position, there is much to cheer and encourage the efforts of the statesman if efficient measures be vigorously and promptly adopted for their remedy.

Our mistakes appear to have had their origin in a misplaced leniency, and in the manifestation of a magnanimity, which was misunderstood, and which conveyed no real and permanent benefit on the conquered.

A proud and corrupt government like that of China, inflated with the highest ideas of self importance, viewed honourable and humane concessions as indications of timidity or of folly, and where it could not oppose force by force, it would naturally resort to the weapons of the weak, dissimulation, cunning, and perfidy. When, therefore, we found ourselves the victors of China, it was our duty, while carefully abstaining from doing ought to diminish the control of the Chinese Government over its subjects, to have adopted such measures, and to have taken such precautions as would have prevented the grievous necessity of another war; by retaining an island or position as a guarantee which would command peace, by the establishment of a permanent British embassy at Pekin, and by securing perfect freedom of intercourse for British subjects with every part of China, internal or maritime.

This would have been sound policy, and at the same time merciful towards both the Chinese Government and people.

The former would probably be saved the disastrous calamities of another war, which may cause the subversion of the ruling dynasty; and the latter as an imitative and tractable people, would have received the great and numerous benefits of an unrestricted communion with a more civilized nation capable of turning to full advantage the qualities of an industrious and peaceable race, in an immense country improved by art, and favoured by nature in a high degree.

In order, therefore, to accomplish the important objects which it appears desirable should be attained by England for the sake of China, as well as for our own interests, the following points are submitted for consideration:—

First. The final cession of Chusan to the British Crown.

(*a*) Failing this cession, the island to be placed under the protection of Great Britain, like the Ionian Islands.

(*b*) This not being granted, Chusan to be made a free port, open to all nations with perfect freedom of residence, &c. &c.

Second. In consideration of the Chinese Government ceding Chusan to England, we might agree to withdraw our consular stations from Amoy, Fuchoo, and perhaps from Ningpo.

Third. If the Chinese Government refuse to cede Chusan, then we ought to demand the permanent establishment of a British minister at Pekin, with a guard of honour from a ship of war, to be constantly stationed in the Peiho, and that all official intercourse be carried on at Pekin.

Fourth.

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Fourth. We ought also to require that British subjects be permitted to reside in every part of China with perfect security for life and property, for the free enjoyment of their religion, and for the prosecution of any lawful and proper business.

Fifth. That other ports in China be open to British maritime commerce; viz., those in the Yan-tze-Kang River and to the northward, and that it be permitted us to navigate any river in China.

Sixth. That one of the other islands of the Chusan group, viz., the populous and cultivated island of Lowang, 26 miles in circumference, or the island of Tchinsanna, 8½ miles long from east to west, with good anchorages in both monsoons, and on the north-east part of the Chusan group or archipelago.

By the adoption of a system of policy based on some definite views like the preceding, we should be establishing a physical and a moral power in China of the utmost consequence to us as a nation, and pregnant with beneficial results of the highest magnitude.

* * * * * *

Hong Kong, 19 April 1845. (signed) *R. M. Martin.*

Note.—Some passages, chiefly referring to the relations between the British Government and Foreign States, of which the publication does not appear to be for the benefit of the public service, have been omitted.

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Ms. Rowena T Robinson
on 29 March, 2019

HONG KONG.

REPORT on *Hong Kong*; REPORT on *Chusan*; and MINUTE on the British Position and Prospects in *China*, by Mr. *R. Montgomery Martin.*

(*Mr. Cayley.*)

Governor *Davis'* Despatch, dated 20 August 1844, enclosing Mr. *Montgomery Martin's* Observations on the Colony of *Hong Kong*; and other Despatches upon the same Subject.

(*Mr. John Ball.*)

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